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KNOWLEDGE AND FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PRIVACY 
Matthew Tokson 
ABSTRACT—This Article examines the central role that knowledge plays 
in determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope. What people know about 
surveillance practices or new technologies often shapes the “reasonable 
expectations of privacy” that define the Fourth Amendment’s boundaries. 
From early decisions dealing with automobile searches to recent cases 
involving advanced information technologies, courts have relied on 
assessments of knowledge in a wide variety of Fourth Amendment 
contexts. Yet the analysis of knowledge in Fourth Amendment law is rarely 
if ever studied on its own. 
This Article fills that gap. It starts by identifying the characteristics of 
Fourth Amendment knowledge. It finds, for instance, that courts typically 
look to societal knowledge rather than individual knowledge, allowing 
them to establish broad precedents to govern police behavior. 
The Article then draws on communications scholarship and research 
on the spread of innovations to identify conceptual problems inherent in 
assessing societal knowledge. It also uses original empirical evidence to 
evaluate courts’ claims regarding societal knowledge in a variety of 
important cases. And it contends that a knowledge-based Fourth 
Amendment will shrink and weaken over time as public awareness of new 
technologies and threats to privacy continues to grow. 
In light of these findings, the Article proposes that the knowledge 
inquiry in Fourth Amendment law, and the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test with which it is intertwined, be replaced with a legal regime 
better able to adjust to technological and social change. The Article offers 
two alternatives, one based on existing laws and property concepts, and the 
other based on direct normative balancing of the benefits and harms of new 
surveillance practices. It analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of these 
alternatives, with the goal of developing a Fourth Amendment regime that 
can effectively protect privacy in novel technological and social contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Roughly ninety-one percent of American adults own a cell phone.1 
Suppose that one of these Americans, John, is a typical cell phone user. He 
takes his phone with him everywhere and uses it regularly. He gives little 
thought to how exactly cell phones work. One day, John hears a disturbing 
news report on the radio. It describes how cell phone companies constantly 
record users’ locations using their cell phone signals.2 If John continues to 
use his cell phone, has he knowingly waived any Fourth Amendment right 
to privacy in his location? More broadly, how should courts assess what 
people know about their privacy? And how does that knowledge relate to 
the “reasonable expectations of privacy” that define the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope?3 
This Article addresses these issues and examines the central role that 
knowledge plays in setting the boundaries of Fourth Amendment 
protection. Courts have relied on assessments of knowledge in a wide 
variety of Fourth Amendment contexts, from early post-Katz decisions 
dealing with automobile searches to recent cases involving advanced 
information technologies and surveillance practices.4 Indeed, evaluating 
knowledge is typically crucial to determining people’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy. Yet the concept of knowledge in Fourth 
Amendment law is rarely if ever studied on its own.5  
This Article identifies several characteristics of the knowledge 
inquiry, although courts’ examination of knowledge in Fourth Amendment 
cases is hardly straightforward or uniform. First, courts generally look to 
what a person should know about privacy-relevant information, rather than 
	
1 LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., CELL PHONE OWNERSHIP HITS 91% OF ADULTS, (June 6, 
2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hits-91-of-adults 
[https://perma.cc/2MUZ-GVBL]. 
2 This is indeed the case, as explained below in Section II.E.1. Episode Five of NPR’s radio series 
“Serial” discussed the use of cell phone company records to determine a person’s location. See Serial: 
Route Talk, NPR (Oct. 23, 2014), https://serialpodcast.org/season-one/5/route-talk. 
3 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope by reference to a citizen’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”).  
4 See infra Part II. 
5 The lengthiest discussions of Fourth Amendment knowledge of which I am aware can be found in 
Mary Graw Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof—Saving the Fourth Amendment from Commercial 
Conditioning by Reviving Voluntariness in Disclosures to Third Parties, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 
377–80 (2013) and Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 588–
90 (2009). See also Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth 
Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 
55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 388–89 (2006) (discussing the various ways courts have treated the question 
of what privacy cell phone users can reasonably expect in their location information). I critique the 
treatment of knowledge in the Fourth Amendment literature in Section II.B, infra. 
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what she actually knows.6 Second, courts typically do this by reaching a 
conclusion about the collective knowledge possessed by society, or 
“societal knowledge,” and then attributing that knowledge to the individual 
citizen.7 They look to societal knowledge both when examining knowing 
exposure to the public and when considering reasonable expectations of 
privacy in general.8 And judges tend to evaluate societal knowledge based 
on their own knowledge or intuition rather than using empirical evidence, 
which is often unavailable.9 
Using societal knowledge to anchor the Fourth Amendment inquiry 
has several advantages for courts. It allows them to avoid particularized 
fact-finding about each citizen’s mental state and to establish broad 
precedents to govern police behavior. Measuring knowledge in the present 
day can also help courts determine future expectations, since, as a general 
matter, our predictions for the future depend on our understanding of the 
present. 
Yet any assessment of societal knowledge presents conceptual 
difficulties. Innovation and communications research, for example, 
recognizes that knowledge is not a simple, binary concept but rather a 
multistep process that is intrinsically difficult to measure.10 Mere awareness 
is not the same as basic comprehension, and basic comprehension differs 
from deep understanding. Courts’ failures to recognize this complexity may 
lead them to assume significant societal knowledge where only minimal 
awareness exists.11 Further, assuming meaningful levels of societal 
knowledge is dangerous when most citizens will rationally remain ignorant 
of many aspects of public policy, technology, and criminal justice.12 
Obtaining detailed knowledge about these topics is costly, and most people 
have little use for such information. Knowledge also tends to spread 
unevenly across populations and is often slowest to reach people with 
lower levels of education and social status.13 This may raise issues of 
fundamental fairness when courts attribute the knowledge of the median 
citizen to individuals with below-median levels of education or wealth. 
These difficulties have led judges to reach erroneous conclusions 
about societal knowledge in a variety of important Fourth Amendment 
	
6 See infra Section II.A. 
7 See infra Section II.A. 
8 See infra Sections II.B–II.C. 
9 See infra Section III.B. 
10 See discussion infra Section III.A.1. 
11 See infra Section III.A.1. 
12 See infra Section III.A.3. 
13 See infra Section III.A.4. 
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cases.14 Judges’ faulty conclusions about knowledge may stem from their 
failure to recognize the multilayered nature of societal knowledge, or from 
hindsight bias and the human tendency to impute one’s knowledge to 
others.15 Whatever the reason, courts’ reliance on empirically incorrect 
findings about societal knowledge is unsustainable. 
Moreover, even if courts could assess societal knowledge with perfect 
accuracy, tying the Fourth Amendment’s scope to such knowledge carries 
serious downsides. The domain of a knowledge-based Fourth Amendment 
is likely to shrink over time, as an increasingly intelligent, educated, and 
technologically adept population learns about new technologies and threats 
to privacy.16 In the meantime, such a regime is inherently unstable, subject 
to unpredictable spikes in public awareness caused by high-salience news 
events or government leaks.17 A knowledge-based Fourth Amendment also 
impedes antisurveillance political advocacy, because educating citizens 
about privacy threats can lead to reduced constitutional protection. 
In light of these disadvantages, this Article proposes that the 
knowledge inquiry in Fourth Amendment law, and the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test with which it is intertwined, be replaced by a 
legal regime that is better able to adjust to technological and social change. 
Building on existing case law18 and scholarship,19 I offer two alternatives to 
a knowledge-centered view of the Fourth Amendment. The first is based on 
existing laws and property concepts, and brings the institutional advantages 
of legislatures to bear on novel technological issues.20 Such a regime could 
maximize predictability and clarity while increasing the stability of Fourth 
Amendment protection. The second calls for courts to engage in a direct 
normative balancing of the benefits and harms of new surveillance 
practices, using a test focusing on the most significant and measureable 
factors in this balance.21 This approach could maximize adaptability to new 
	
14 See infra Section III.A.3. 
15 See infra Sections III.A.1–III.B.2. 
16 See infra Section IV.C. 
17 See infra Section IV.B. 
18 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding the defendant 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the contents of a partially uncovered greenhouse when 
an officer observed marijuana growing from a low-flying helicopter in public airspace); Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984) (describing the security issues unique to prisons and describing 
the analysis of the reasonable expectation of privacy as “necessarily entail[ing] a balancing of interests” 
between those security concerns and individuals’ privacy). 
19 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 
507–22 (2007); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 
(2005). 
20 See infra Section V.B. 
21 See infra Section V.C. 
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technologies and prevent the erosion of the Fourth Amendment as societal 
knowledge increases. 
The Article examines the strengths and weaknesses of these 
alternatives relative to each other and to current law. Ultimately, the goal of 
this discussion is to develop a Fourth Amendment regime that can 
effectively protect privacy in novel technological and social contexts. 
Part I of this Article discusses the general history and nature of the 
test, established in Katz, that currently governs Fourth Amendment scope. 
Part II explores how courts rely on assessments of societal knowledge to 
decide a wide variety of Fourth Amendment questions. Part III examines 
the conceptual and practical difficulties of measuring societal knowledge. It 
also reports the results of an original survey of cell phone users that 
measured users’ knowledge of cell phone surveillance techniques. It then 
compares the results to those intuited by judges in cell phone surveillance 
cases. Part IV discusses the instability of a knowledge-based Fourth 
Amendment regime and the potential for erosion over time as public 
knowledge of surveillance grows. Part V offers alternative approaches for 
determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope and explores the strengths and 
weaknesses of each alternative. 
I. THE KATZ TEST 
The law governing the Fourth Amendment’s scope is not a model of 
clarity. It has been criticized as confusing,22 illogical,23 chaotic,24 and 
inconsistent across cases.25 Yet the contours of the test for Fourth 
Amendment coverage are relatively well-defined.26 This Part briefly 
describes this test and the current state of Fourth Amendment law. 
A. Development of the Katz Test 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause.”27 The Supreme Court has generally interpreted 
	
22 Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local 
Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149–50 (1998). 
23 Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 
34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1321 (1981). 
24 Donald R.C. Pongrace, Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction: 
An Opportunity for Clarity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1191, 1208 (1985). 
25 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511–12 (2010). 
26 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177–78 (1984). 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
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the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard to require that the 
government obtain a warrant prior to searching or seizing.28 
The scope of the Fourth Amendment is potentially very broad, 
covering all searches and seizures of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” 
But the Constitution offers no definition of what a “search” (or a “seizure”) 
is for Fourth Amendment purposes, and there is no direct history on the 
subject.29 In general, a search can be any examination of any thing—“[a]n 
enquiry, an examination, the act of seeking,” as a Founding Era dictionary 
put it,30 or “scrutiny for the purpose of finding a person or thing [or the] 
investigation of a question,” as a modern dictionary defines it.31 The 
Supreme Court has never required that the police obtain a warrant before 
seeking any information or object, a mandate that would severely disable 
the practice of law enforcement. The Court has always defined “search” far 
more narrowly.32 
In its pre-Katz Fourth Amendment cases, the Court limited the 
coverage of the Fourth Amendment to “material things”33 and 
“constitutionally protected area[s].”34 Accordingly, in a landmark 1928 
case, Olmstead v. United States, the Court held that government officers 
did not conduct a “search” when they tapped Olmstead’s telephone lines 
and listened to his conversations for several months.35 The conversations 
were not material things like “papers” or “effects” and the officers 
therefore committed no trespass on Olmstead’s property when they tapped 
the public telephone wires.36 
	
28 E.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961). There are several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including exceptions for 
automobiles, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925), exigent circumstances, Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)), 
and searches incident to arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). 
29 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Luis G. Stelzner, The Fourth Amendment: The 
Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 N.M. L. REV. 33, 35–41 (1979–1980) (providing a historical 
account of the origins and drafting of the Fourth Amendment). 
30 Search (s. from the verb), JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE: TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, A COMPREHENSIVE GRAMMAR (2d ed. 1795). 
31 Search, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).  
32 See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (holding that a police officer’s opening 
of a car door to locate a vehicle identification number was not a search). 
33 E.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (ruling that the text of the Fourth 
Amendment expressly limits its coverage to tangible items), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
34 E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–12 (1961) (discussing cases holding that the 
government did not commit a Fourth Amendment “search” when it did not encroach on any 
constitutionally protected area, such as a house or office). 
35 277 U.S. at 456–57, 466. 
36 Id. at 457, 464. 
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This rigid conception of the Fourth Amendment allowed for 
widespread government wiretapping and bugging during the middle 
decades of the twentieth century. From 1941 to the mid-1960s, for instance, 
the FBI recorded nearly a half million conversations.37 It often used these 
recordings to monitor political groups, influence judicial appointments, 
threaten civil rights leaders, and intimidate or discredit members of 
Congress investigating its activities.38 
In 1967, the Supreme Court reversed course.39 In Katz v. United 
States, the Court held that government agents conducted a search when 
they placed a recording device on the outside of a public telephone booth 
and recorded a telephone conversation.40 The Court overturned Olmstead 
and rejected the idea that the Fourth Amendment was limited to certain 
areas or to tangible objects.41 The majority opinion did not, however, set 
out any new method of discerning the Fourth Amendment’s extent.42 Nor 
did it explain the reasoning behind its holding in any detail, except to say 
that the telephone had come to play a “vital role” in private 
communication.43 
The test that governs the Fourth Amendment’s scope in most cases44 
comes instead from Justice Harlan’s short concurrence in Katz. Harlan 
described the test’s two requirements as follows: “[F]irst that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”45 
In subsequent cases, this is often stated as a single inquiry—whether the 
	
37  ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS, BUGS, INFORMERS, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 17 (1992); Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 581, 583 (2011). 
38 CHARNS, supra note 37, at 17, 24–31; Tokson, supra note 37, at 583. 
39 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44, 54 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 
(1967). The Court may have been motivated by the growing controversy over FBI wiretapping practices 
and the Justice Department’s increasing disclosure of such practices to the courts. See CHARNS, supra 
note 37, at 77; CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 593–94 (1991). 
40 389 U.S. at 348, 353. 
41 Id. at 350–51, 353.  
42 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 385 
(1974).  
43 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
44 Acts of government that trespass on constitutionally protected areas may also violate the Fourth 
Amendment. After decades of largely ignoring trespass concepts in Fourth Amendment law, the 
Supreme Court has recently decided two cases based on the finding that police officers committed a 
physical intrusion while seeking information. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013); 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–51 (2012). 
45 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
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person at issue had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the thing 
examined by the police.46 
The Katz test is simple and concise on the page. But in application it is 
frequently puzzling, and its true nature remains something of a mystery.47 Is 
it a probabilistic test, asking whether a person is empirically likely to be 
observed in a certain context? Or is it largely a normative test, asking 
whether a person should be entitled to expect privacy in certain aspects of 
life? Arguably, the test has both empirical and normative elements, but how 
these elements interact or how to reconcile them when they conflict 
remains unclear.48 
B. From Subjective Expectation to Knowing Exposure 
Adding to the confusion surrounding the Katz test is the Court’s 
acknowledgement that the subjective portion of the test should not be 
applied literally.49 If the scope of the Fourth Amendment actually depended 
upon the subjective beliefs of a citizen, then the government could insulate 
invasive surveillance programs from Fourth Amendment challenge simply 
by announcing them to people in advance. For example, a state could 
announce that it will henceforth conduct random searches of all houses 
owned by citizens with a prior drug conviction. Following the 
announcement, no citizen with a prior drug conviction would expect her 
house to be safe from government search. Yet the Court has said that it 
would not apply the subjective test in such a situation, and would instead 
find that citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes 
despite the absence of a subjective expectation of privacy.50 
	
46 E.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., 
concurring)) (“[T]he State’s intrusion . . . cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless the area 
is one in which there is a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’”); Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring)) (“Since 
Katz v. United States, the touchstone of Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person 
has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’”).  
47 See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 476, 533–34 (2011) (“[T]he ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test is widely considered one of 
the great mysteries of Fourth Amendment law . . . and opinions differ on even the basic question of 
whether the inquiry is descriptive or normative.” (footnotes omitted)).  
48 This issue is discussed below in Part II and Section V.A. 
49 See infra note 50.  
50 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 n.5 (1979); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 
525 n.7 (1984) (“The Court has always emphasized” the objective reasonableness prong of the Katz test 
rather than “the privacy expectations of particular defendants in particular situations . . . .” (quoting 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 
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Moreover, courts apply the subjective prong of the Katz test in only a 
small minority of cases (roughly 12%, according to one study).51 Even in 
those cases, the subjective prong rarely determines case outcomes.52 
Courts appear to deemphasize an individual’s subjective expectation 
and to focus instead on whether the individual has knowingly waived her 
privacy in her information (or her property, etc.) such that the Fourth 
Amendment no longer protects it.53 If the person has knowingly exposed 
her information to the public, for instance by publishing it in a newspaper, 
then she no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information.54 If she has not knowingly exposed her information, then the 
information is protected so long as people would generally consider it 
reasonable to expect privacy in the information.55 
Thus, in practice, the Katz test seems to ask the following: (1) Has the 
person in question waived her privacy in her information by knowingly 
exposing it to the public? and (2) If not, then could the person have had an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the information? If there 
was no waiver and if the person could reasonably expect privacy, then the 
Fourth Amendment applies, and the police generally must obtain a warrant 
before examining the information at issue. 
The analysis of knowledge plays a pivotal role in both parts of the 
Katz test. The next Section explores how courts use knowledge to 
determine “knowing exposure” to the public and to measure reasonable 
expectations of privacy.56 
	
51 Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 113, 117–18 (2015) (examining every case that applied the Katz test in 2012 and finding that only 
12% of Fourth Amendment cases decided that year purported to apply the subjective prong). 
52 Id. at 119–21. 
53 Id. at 128–29 (discussing the shifting of the Supreme Court’s typical Fourth Amendment inquiry 
from subjective expectation to knowing exposure); Smith, 442 U.S. at 740–41 n.5 (directing courts to 
ignore the subjective prong in certain situations where it would dictate a different outcome than the 
objective prong); see also infra Section II.C (describing Fourth Amendment cases applying the 
knowing exposure test).  
54 See Kerr, supra note 51, at 126–27 (discussing voluntary exposure cases and describing the 
subjective test in these cases as “akin to a consent doctrine”). Several cases applying this principle are 
discussed in Section II.C. 
55 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
56 See id. at 351 (majority opinion) (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966)) 
(holding that there is no Fourth Amendment protection for information that a person “knowingly 
exposes to the public”). 
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II. KNOWLEDGE AND THE REASONABLE  
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
As mentioned above, the Katz inquiry into reasonable expectations of 
privacy can have both empirical and normative elements.57 Courts 
sometimes engage in normative analysis when deciding Fourth 
Amendment cases.58 On rare occasions, they rely exclusively on such an 
analysis.59 But typically, courts applying Katz inquire into people’s actual 
expectations of privacy.60 
In these cases, the Katz inquiry frequently hinges on the assessment of 
what members of society know. Likewise, assertions about knowledge play 
a substantial role in cases that look to both expectations of privacy and 
normative considerations.61 This Part examines how courts have used 
knowledge to help define the Fourth Amendment’s boundaries.62 
A. Knowledge and Expectation 
As noted above, the concept of knowing exposure to the public plays a 
large role in determining the reach of the Fourth Amendment following 
Katz.63 Assessing people’s knowledge is, of course, essential to determining 
whether they have knowingly exposed their information to the public. But 
knowledge plays an even broader role in determining the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope. What a person expects is largely a function of what 
they know. If I know that a high school band marches past my house every 
Sunday morning from 10:00 to 10:30 AM, then it is reasonable for me to 
expect a lot of noise on Sunday mornings. It is also reasonable to expect 
	
57 See supra text accompanying notes 47–48. 
58 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
59 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 
407–09 (2005) (holding that a dog sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search because any expectation of 
privacy in contraband cannot be “legitimate”). 
60 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 
98–99 (1990); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988); United States v. Heckenkamp, 
482 F.3d 1142, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007). 
61 See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1985); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
742–45 (1979). 
62 This Article’s analysis is limited to the assessment of expectations of privacy in Fourth 
Amendment law. Although courts examine expectations of privacy in privacy tort cases, the inquiry is 
different in several substantial ways. See Strahilevitz, supra note 19, at 933–34 & n.35 (noting, for 
example, that the objective inquiry predominates in Fourth Amendment law, while subjective 
expectations play a large role in privacy torts). Further, privacy tort cases have typically eschewed 
inquiry into societal expectations of privacy, focusing instead on the ex ante likelihood of public 
dissemination of the plaintiff’s personal information. Id. at 934–35.  
63 See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 146–47 (2002) (discussing the importance of the 
“knowing exposure” concept in Fourth Amendment law). 
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that I will not have much privacy when I sunbathe in my front yard 
between 10:00 and 10:30 AM. My expectations of privacy stem from my 
knowledge about the band. In this scenario and countless others, 
knowledge is the foundation on which expectations are built. 
Assessing knowledge can also provide courts with a way to make the 
complex Katz inquiry into “expectation” more tractable. An expectation is 
an internal belief about the uncertain future. Other people’s expectations 
can be difficult to intuit, and there will rarely be direct external evidence of 
a person’s expectations in a given situation. By contrast, a person’s 
knowledge is more likely to be inferable from external sources, such as 
something she has seen or read. 
Courts frequently rely on their assessments of knowledge to determine 
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.64 But courts’ 
examination of knowledge tends to be broad and abstract rather than 
particular. They generally look to what a person should know, rather than 
what she actually did know.65 In the Fourth Amendment context, courts do 
this by reaching a conclusion about the collective knowledge possessed by 
society and then imputing that knowledge to the person at issue.66 Thus, if 
most people know that taking an action would result in a loss of privacy, 
then an individual taking that action will be found to have “knowingly” 
exposed her information, regardless of her actual knowledge.67 For 
example, in United States v. Forrester,68 the Ninth Circuit held that a 
defendant had knowingly exposed his email to/from information and the IP 
addresses of the websites he visited. The court concluded that users in 
general “should know that this information is provided to and used by 
Internet service providers.”69 It did not inquire whether the defendant 
actually knew that he was exposing his data to third parties.70 
It may seem strange for courts to decide that an individual has 
knowingly waived her privacy based not on what she knew but on what 
	
64 See infra Sections II.B–II.C. 
65 See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762 (2010) (reasoning that Quon “should have 
known” that his text messages would be read by his employers); see Christopher Slobogin, Public 
Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 268 
(2002) (“[T]he Court has indicated that government need not show actual knowledge of exposure to 
nullify Fourth Amendment protection. If a target should have known public exposure might occur, the 
Court has held, one assumes the risk of such exposure and loses Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
66 See infra note 67.  
67 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979) (finding that a telephone user 
knowingly exposed the numbers that he dialed). 
68 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007). 
69 Id. 
70 See id. at 509–10. 
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people in general know.71 But there are several advantages to this method 
from the perspective of the courts. Basing the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment on what each individual knows about the disclosure of her 
information would substantially increase decision costs for judges and 
render the Fourth Amendment’s coverage inconsistent across similar fact 
patterns. Judges addressing a common police surveillance situation could 
not simply decide the case based on prior case law but would have to 
engage in a fact-heavy assessment of each individual’s state of knowledge. 
In many cases there would be no extrinsic evidence of the person’s 
knowledge, and she would have strong incentives to feign ignorance or 
otherwise obscure her actual knowledge.72 By contrast, if everyone is 
presumed to have a standard set of societal knowledge, then case outcomes 
will be the same for all parties. 
Of course, it is possible that courts making assertions about societal 
knowledge may not actually be concerned with empirical accuracy. The 
rhetoric of knowledge may, for these courts, mask the normative judgment 
that actually drives the decision.73 Such a possibility can neither be proved 
nor entirely ruled out. What is clear is that the concept and the language of 
societal knowledge play a prominent role in Fourth Amendment law, and 
many courts engage in detailed examinations of societal knowledge about 
privacy and surveillance.74 
The next few Sections examine how courts have used assessments of 
societal knowledge to reach broad conclusions about the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope. 
	
71 Overt consideration of societal knowledge is rare in the law, although there are a few areas of 
law that expressly evaluate it. In trademark dilution claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012), 
courts assess whether the plaintiff’s mark is “famous,” defined as “widely recognized by the general 
consuming public of the United States.” This inquiry essentially asks how aware the public is of a 
certain brand. See, e.g., Coach Svcs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1373–76 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). Requests for change of venue often involve assertions about potential jurors’ awareness of a 
relevant news story. See Williams v. Superior Court, 668 P.2d 799, 801–04 (Cal. 1983) (in bank). This 
inquiry is not society-wide, however, and is typically limited to one jurisdiction. See id.  
72 See Strahilevitz, supra note 19, at 933.  
73 See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 240–42 (2003) (discussing the 
normative considerations driving some seemingly positivist Fourth Amendment decisions); Kerr, supra 
note 19, at 519, 522 (suggesting that normative considerations may drive outcomes in Fourth 
Amendment cases even when the opinion focuses on expectations of privacy or positive law); see also 
infra the discussion accompanying notes 346–49.  
74 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979); In re Smartphone Geolocation Data 
Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 140 & n.19, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33 
(N.J. 2008).   
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B. The Knowledge Inquiry in Reasonable  
Expectations of Privacy Cases 
People’s knowledge about surveillance technologies, police practices, 
existing laws, and the behavior of private entities shapes their expectations 
of privacy. Courts accordingly look to collective knowledge when 
attempting to determine which expectations of privacy are reasonable. 
For example, government regulations can themselves erode people’s 
expectations of privacy, as long as people are generally aware of the 
regulations. Vehicle owners’ collective knowledge provides a basis for 
diminished Fourth Amendment protection for automobiles. The Supreme 
Court has concluded that “[t]he public is fully aware that it is accorded less 
privacy in its automobiles” because of the pervasive nature of automobile 
regulation and the “everyday occurrence” of police stops for minor 
infractions.75 As a result, “there is a reduced expectation of privacy” in 
motor vehicles.76 
The Court has found that participants in certain heavily regulated 
businesses lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in their business 
records and property because they “must already be aware” of a history of 
close government supervision over such businesses.77 Under this reasoning, 
the Fourth Amendment does not cover most government inspections of 
liquor stores,78 firearms dealerships,79 mining facilities,80 or junkyards,81 
because when a person chooses to operate one of these businesses, she does 
so “with the knowledge” that her business records and property may be 
inspected.82 
Similarly, in City of Ontario v. Quon, the Court held that a police 
officer had a limited expectation of privacy in the texts he sent from a city-
	
75 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Ross, 
456 U.S. 798, 806 n.8 (1982) (finding that “individuals always had been on notice that movable vessels 
may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, 
without the protection afforded by a magistrate’s prior evaluation of those facts”). 
76 Carney, 471 U.S. at 393. This lowered expectation of privacy helps to justify the lack of a 
warrant requirement for automobile searches, so long as the police possess probable cause to search the 
automobile for evidence of a crime. Id. at 392. 
77 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978). 
78 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75–77 (1970). 
79 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).  
80 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600, 602 (1981). 
81 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703–04 (1987).  
82 Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316; see also, e.g., Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600 (finding no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when “the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined 
that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to 
periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes”). 
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owned pager because he should have known that the texts might be read.83 
Although the officer’s supervisor had told him that the department would 
not audit his messages due to data overages, the Court nonetheless 
concluded that a reasonable officer “would or should have known that his 
actions were likely to come under legal scrutiny” at some point, and that “a 
reasonable employee would be aware” that his pager would eventually be 
audited.84 
Just as knowledge can undermine privacy, lack of knowledge can be 
the basis for upholding it. For example, the Court held that a seller 
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in pornographic videos 
shipped in a package that was opened by a private party and then sent to the 
FBI.85 The fact that the package was opened during shipping did not affect 
the seller’s Fourth Amendment rights, because the seller had no way of 
knowing about it and no reason to expect it.86 People’s expectations of 
privacy could not be “altered in any way by subsequent events of which 
they were obviously unaware.”87 
Even when the Court’s assessment of societal knowledge is largely 
implicit, it is often an important issue in Fourth Amendment cases. 
Dissenting Justices sometimes argue that the majority has incorrectly 
assessed collective knowledge and accordingly reached an erroneous 
conclusion about expectations of privacy. For instance, in Bond v. United 
States,88 Justice Breyer (joined in dissent by Justice Scalia) argued that 
there was no general expectation of privacy against police touching of 
carry-on luggage because “[a]ny person who has travelled on a common 
carrier knows that luggage placed in an overhead compartment is always at 
the mercy of all people who want to rearrange or move previously placed 
luggage.”89 The dissenters disagreed with the majority’s implicit 
determination that bus passengers were unaware that their luggage was 
	
83 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762 (2010). 
84 Id. at 752, 762; see also id. at 766 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is clear that respondent Jeff 
Quon, as a law enforcement officer who served on a SWAT Team, should have understood that all of 
his work-related actions—including all of his communications on his official pager—were likely to be 
subject to public and legal scrutiny.”). 
85 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658–59 (1980) (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
86 Id. at 658–59 & n.12. 
87 Id. at 658–59 n.12. 
88 529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
89 Id. at 340 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320, 1327 (7th 
Cir. 1996), abrogated by Bond, 529 U.S. 334); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 223–24 & 
n.8 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (contending that people know that there is little risk of overflight 
surveillance from commercial aircraft). 
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likely to be handled or probed. As a result, they disagreed on the ultimate 
question of whether passengers had an expectation of privacy.90 
The use of collective knowledge to set the boundaries of Fourth 
Amendment protection is not confined to the Supreme Court. Lower courts 
and state courts have also relied heavily on assessments of knowledge 
when determining reasonable expectations of privacy under the Katz test. 
For example, knowledge of workplace policies or inspection protocols can 
defeat a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s office91 or on one’s hard 
drive.92 Parolees’ awareness of the possibility of intrusions into their houses 
by parole officers results in “a severely diminished expectation of privacy” 
in their homes.93 Prisoners’ knowledge of mail inspection policies can 
eliminate any expectation of privacy in their letters.94 And, although mine 
owners “cannot help but be aware that [they] ‘will be subject to effective 
inspection’” and thus lack a Fourth Amendment right against warrantless 
inspections, mine employees are not “on notice” that they personally will 
be examined and therefore retain Fourth Amendment protection against 
personal searches.95 Courts recognize that people’s expectations of privacy 
are largely a function of what they know, and, accordingly, courts 
frequently assess societal knowledge in Fourth Amendment cases. 
C. The Knowledge Inquiry in “Knowing Exposure” Cases 
Societal knowledge also plays a prominent role in cases where the 
government asserts that an individual has “knowingly expose[d]” her 
information to the public and thereby waived any claim to Fourth 
Amendment protection.96 If a person knows or should know that others can 
easily access their information, but takes no steps to prevent such access, 
then courts are likely to find that she lacks any reasonable expectation of 
	
90 See Bond, 529 U.S. at 339–40 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
91 See, e.g., Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1991).  
92 See, e.g., Bradley v. Pfizer, Inc., 440 F. App’x 805, 810 (11th Cir. 2011). 
93 United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 665 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Reyes, 
283 F.3d 446, 461 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also, e.g., United States v. Hedrick, 146 F. App’x 871, 872 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (“Since the inception of the probation and parole systems, probationers and parolees have 
understood that they are subject to home visits from time to time . . . .”); United States v. Wilson, 105 F. 
App’x 498, 500 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (finding the defendant “was aware that his expectation of 
privacy was diminished by virtue of his parolee status”); State v. Patrick, 381 So. 2d 501, 503 (La. 
1980) (finding that “defendant was aware that he would be searched upon his re-entry into the detention 
facility at the end of each day” and thus his “expectations of privacy were minimal, if any, under the 
circumstances”).  
94 See, e.g., State v. Wiley, 565 S.E.2d 22, 33 (N.C. 2002). 
95 Commonwealth v. Burgan, 450 S.E.2d 177, 180 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Donovan v. 
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981)). 
96 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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privacy. This concept has become increasingly important due to the 
expanding role of the “third party doctrine,” which holds that the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to personal information disclosed to a party 
other than the intended recipient of a communication.97 Thus, knowing 
exposure can eliminate Fourth Amendment protection when information is 
exposed to the whole world98 or just a single third party.99 
Courts typically determine whether a person has knowingly exposed 
her information by assessing what people in general know about 
information exposure and then attributing that knowledge to the individual. 
For example, the Court analyzed public knowledge in Smith v. Maryland, 
ruling that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to dialed 
telephone numbers.100 The Court explained that telephone users knowingly 
disclose telephone numbers to a third party and thereby waive their 
privacy: 
All telephone users realize that they must “convey” phone numbers to the 
telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching 
equipment that their calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, 
that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the 
numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their 
monthly bills.101 
The Court also emphasized that most telephone books contain a page 
labeled “Consumer Information” that informs readers that the telephone 
company “can frequently help in identifying to the authorities the origin of 
unwelcome and troublesome calls.”102 The Court concluded that telephone 
	
97 For an example of the Court applying third-party doctrine, see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
744–45 (1979). The third-party doctrine’s significance in Fourth Amendment law has increased in the 
internet age, as an ever-growing amount of information is transmitted or stored by third-party service 
providers. See Tokson, supra note 37, at 598, 602–04.  
98 E.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986). 
99 E.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976)); 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (finding no Fourth Amendment protection when an 
informant “was in the suite by invitation, and every conversation which he heard was either directed to 
him or knowingly carried on in his presence”). 
100 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46. Accordingly, the police may capture such numbers with an 
electronic device, even in the absence of a warrant or any suspicion. Id. 
101 Id. at 742. The Court then discussed how “pen registers”—electronic devices used for recording 
dialed telephone numbers—were used in fraud investigations and where a phone is subject to a special 
billing structure. Id. (citing United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174–75 (1977)); Hodge v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 266 (9th Cir. 1977)). Although the Court conceded that 
“most people may be oblivious” to these specific uses of pen registers, “they presumably have some 
awareness of one common use: to aid in the identification of persons making annoying or obscene 
calls.” Id. (citing Von Lusch v. C & P Tel. Co., 457 F. Supp. 814, 816 (D. Md. 1978)). 
102 Id. at 742–43 (first citing BALTIMORE TELEPHONE DIRECTORY 21 (1978); and then citing 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TELEPHONE DIRECTORY 13 (1978)). 
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users “typically know that they must convey numerical information to the 
phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this 
information; and that the phone company does in fact record this 
information for a variety of legitimate business purposes.”103 As a result, 
the Court held that no rational telephone subscriber could expect her dialed 
telephone numbers to be private.104 
Similarly, the Supreme Court found knowing exposure to the public in 
California v. Greenwood,105 holding that the police can open and examine 
the contents of trash bags left on the curb outside of a house without 
conducting any “search” under the Fourth Amendment.106 The Court found 
that “[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the 
side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, 
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”107 Accordingly, the 
defendants could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage 
that they knowingly exposed to potential “public inspection.”108 
State courts and lower courts likewise frequently assess societal 
knowledge when analyzing whether a person has knowingly exposed her 
information to the public. In these cases, “public awareness” of third party 
data gathering can “negate any constitutionally sufficient expectation of 
privacy.”109 In recent years, these courts have relied upon assessments of 
collective knowledge to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies 
to new technologies and contexts. Some of these cases draw direct 
analogies to the Supreme Court’s cases relying on societal knowledge. For 
example, in United States v. Forrester,110 the Ninth Circuit answered the 
question of whether the Fourth Amendment protects email to/from 
addresses and the IP addresses111 of websites a user visits by drawing a 
parallel to the Court’s assessment of collective knowledge in Smith.112 The 
Ninth Circuit noted that “Smith based its holding that telephone users have 
	
103 Id. at 743. 
104 Id. 
105 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
106 Id. at 37. 
107 Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted) (citing People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262, 1269 (Cal. 1971)). 
108 Id. at 41 (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
109 Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 256–57 (9th Cir. 1977) (footnote 
omitted); see also United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]elephone subscribers 
have no reasonable expectation that records of their calls will not be made. It is, in fact, well known that 
such records are kept.”). 
110 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008). 
111 In this context, an IP address is the unique sequence of numbers that identifies a website or 
group of websites on the internet. See id. at 510 n.5. 
112 Id. at 510. 
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no expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial on the users’ imputed 
knowledge that their calls are completed through telephone company 
switching equipment.”113 It then held that website and email addresses are 
not protected by the Fourth Amendment because of the knowledge of 
internet users: “users have no expectation of privacy . . . because they 
should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet 
service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of 
information.”114 Other courts have held that users have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their IP address, based on their lack of knowledge 
about the internet: “[W]hen users surf the Web from the privacy of their 
homes, they have reason to expect that their actions are confidential. Many 
are unaware that a numerical IP address can be captured by the websites 
they visit.”115 Users’ lack of understanding of how websites operate 
provided the basis for a reasonable expectation of privacy.116 
Knowledge is also a key factor in deciding the Fourth Amendment 
status of other types of information, from the personal information 
associated with an Internet Service Provider (ISP) account,117 to 
communications from a personal computer on a college’s computer 
network.118 In the first set of cases to address whether government 
collection of emails is covered by the Fourth Amendment, the Sixth Circuit 




115 State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33 (N.J. 2008). The court also stated that “[m]ore sophisticated 
users understand that [their IP addresses], standing alone, reveal[] little if anything to the outside 
world.” Id. For these users, the knowledge that their IP addresses alone do not reveal their identities is 
the basis for a reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP addresses. Id. Apparently combining the 
knowledge of these sophisticated users with the lack of knowledge of most users, the court found a 
general reasonable expectation of privacy in a user’s IP address. Id. Again, general societal knowledge 
was the touchstone of expectations of privacy. 
116 Id. 
117 E.g., United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *3–4 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 
2000) (per curiam) (holding that a defendant’s information was not protected by the Fourth Amendment 
because, when the defendant “entered into a service agreement with MindSpring, he knowingly 
revealed [his subscriber] information to MindSpring and its employees”); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. 
Supp. 2d 843, 848 (D. Md. 2005) (finding no expectation of privacy in subscriber information given to 
AOL because AOL customer agreement stated that AOL would turn over such information to the 
government if compelled by legal process). 
118 United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. 
Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 2002)) (“[P]rivacy expectations may be reduced if the user is 
advised that information transmitted through the network is not confidential and that the systems 
administrators may monitor communications transmitted by the user.”). 
119 See Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc 
on ripeness grounds, Warshak v. United States (Warshak II), 532 F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008); 
Warshak II, 532 F.3d at 526–27; Warshak v. United States (Warshak III), 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 
2010).  
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judges inferred customers’ knowledge based on the user agreements that 
their email service providers promulgate.120 Thus, “where a user agreement 
explicitly provides that e-mails and other files will be monitored or 
audited . . . the user’s knowledge of this fact may well extinguish his 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”121 The Sixth Circuit noted that the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry “may well shift over time” and would 
“assuredly shift[] from internet-service agreement to internet-service 
agreement.”122 It ultimately concluded that the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his emails because his ISP user agreement did not 
inform him that the ISP would “‘audit, inspect, and monitor’ its 
subscriber’s emails.”123 
D. Knowledge in Fourth Amendment Scholarship 
Much of the scholarship on the Fourth Amendment’s scope assumes 
that courts must assess collective knowledge in applying Katz’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test.124 Several scholars have implicitly or explicitly 
endorsed this knowledge-centered approach.125 
Mary Leary, for example, has written that courts should be especially 
attentive to consumer knowledge when answering Fourth Amendment 
questions.126 She contends that a consumer does not waive her right to 
privacy when a third party obtains information without the consumer’s 
knowledge.127 By contrast, the reduction of Fourth Amendment protection 
“seems fair to the consumer regarding information the consumer directly 
disclosed knowingly to the primary party.”128 Likewise, Orin Kerr has 
defended the Third Party Doctrine as a doctrine of knowing consent to a 
search, arguing that a person’s disclosure of information constitutes 
consent to a search if and only if “[the] person knows that they are 
disclosing information to a third party.”129 Other scholars have made similar 
	
120 See cases cited supra note 119. 
121 Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 473.  
122 Warshak II, 532 F.3d at 526–27. 
123 Warshak III, 631 F.3d at 287. 
124 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing 
Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1417–18 
(2002). 
125 See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of 
Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 745 (2011); Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to 
Increase the Productivity of the Fourth Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 590, 592 (2013). 
126 Leary, supra note 5, at 378–80. 
127 See id. at 343. 
128 Id. at 380. 
129 Kerr, supra note 5, at 588. 
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arguments. Because knowledge provides the basis for people’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy, assessments of knowledge pervade the scholarship 
of the Katz test no less than the cases applying it.130 
E. Knowledge and New Surveillance Technologies—A Case Study 
As government surveillance techniques evolve, they can pose novel 
and difficult Fourth Amendment questions. In the absence of controlling 
precedent, courts generally answer these questions by applying the Katz 
test. Courts examine people’s reasonable expectations of privacy, and this 
inquiry naturally leads them to examine societal knowledge.131 Yet 
assessing such knowledge is especially difficult in the context of new 
technologies and social practices. There are typically no surveys or other 
empirical studies to guide the inquiry and no long-established social 
practices to which judges can refer.132 
This Section addresses one particularly important, and especially 
troubling, example of courts relying on societal knowledge to determine 
how the Fourth Amendment applies to new surveillance technologies. In 
recent years, law enforcement officials have frequently sought to track cell 
phone users by obtaining location data produced by the users’ phones.133 
The resulting criminal cases are potentially of enormous importance in 
Fourth Amendment law. In these cases, courts are asked to reconcile two 
competing principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. One is the 
recognition by five Justices of the Supreme Court that long-term 
surveillance of people’s locations can be destructive of personal privacy.134 
The other is the Third Party Doctrine principle that information knowingly 
turned over to a third party cannot be protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.135 
	
130 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 125; Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without 
Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1327–28 (2012); Slobogin, supra note 124, at 1416–17.  
131 See supra Section II.A. 
132 By contrast, it may be easier to infer societal knowledge about practices such as trash collection, 
which had been around for decades by the time California v. Greenwood was decided. See 486 U.S. 35, 
40 & nn.2–4 (1988); JON ROBERTS, OKLAHOMA DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
WASTE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND OKLAHOMA, http://www.deq.state.ok.us/lpdnew/
wastehistory/wastehistory.htm [https://perma.cc/V234-FDZL]. 
133 See James Beck et al., The Use of Global Positioning (GPS) and Cell Tower Evidence to 
Establish a Person’s Location—Part II, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 637 (2013).  
134 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(contending that extended surveillance of a person’s movements in public violates a reasonable 
expectation of privacy); id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Alito and 
describing how locational surveillance “generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations”). 
135 See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
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The federal appeals courts that have addressed the question of cell 
phone location tracking have resolved this tension by focusing intently on 
the collective knowledge of cell phone users.136 This Section describes how 
cell phone location tracking works and examines how courts have used 
societal knowledge to address the difficult Fourth Amendment questions 
raised by this new form of surveillance. 
1. Cell Site Location Information.—When you call a friend on your 
cell phone, the phone converts your voice into a signal that is transmitted 
via radio waves to a cell phone tower.137 The cell phone tower system then 
relays the radio waves to your friend’s phone, which translates them back 
into sound.138 
When you place the call, your phone selects the cell site (i.e., the cell 
tower) with which it has the strongest connection; this is usually the closest 
tower.139 Typically, different antennas on the tower will serve different 
sectors of the area around the tower.140 By noting which antenna received 
your signal, the cell phone company can determine that you were in the 
particular sector covered by the antenna.141 As the number of cell towers 
proliferates, this information can reveal your location within a relatively 
small geographic area.142 Furthermore, federal law requires that cell phone 
companies maintain the capability to record a subject’s cell site location 
information (CSLI) at the beginning and end of a call,143 and cell phone 
companies do in fact record and store this location data for billing and other 
purposes.144 
	
136 See infra Section II.E.2. 




139 Beck et al., supra note 133, at 643. When a person makes a call, the phone connects to “the cell 
site with which it has the strongest connection,” but “[d]ue to a number of factors, including topography 
and call volume, that tower is not always the closest tower to the cell phone.” Id.  
140 Id. at 641.  
141 Id. at 645.  
142 ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 15–16 (2010) (testimony of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor, Penn Engineering) 
[hereinafter Blaze Testimony]. In addition, by recording the times that a user’s telephone signal arrives 
at multiple cell towers, a company can calculate the phone’s location with a precision similar to that of 
GPS. Id. at 23; see Beck et al., supra note 133, at 648. 
143 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 14 FCC Rcd. 16794 ¶¶44–45 (1999) 
(“Third Report and Order”); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(a)(2) (2012). 
144 Beck et al., supra note 133, at 640.  
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Cell phone users can be tracked even when they are not making phone 
calls. An active cell phone “registers” with cell towers by emitting a signal 
roughly every seven seconds.145 This allows the network to locate the phone 
so that it can receive and make calls.146 It also allows cell phone companies 
to track users’ locations constantly and accurately, by recording the times 
when a given cell phone’s registration signal hits various cell towers.147 
Several cell companies store this highly precise location data along with 
similar data associated with incoming and outgoing calls.148 This practice is 
likely widespread, because the relative cost of data storage is low and 
location data is useful for network management, research, and marketing.149 
However, the precise data retention policies of specific cellular providers 
tend to be unknown, as companies typically refuse to disclose such policies 
and may consider them to be trade secrets.150 
2. Collective Knowledge in Location Surveillance Cases.—Like GPS 
location-tracking technology, CSLI can reveal intimate details about a 
person’s life by allowing an observer to track wherever a person travels 
with her cell phone. As the D.C. Circuit has noted, someone “who knows 
all of another’s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a 
heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband . . . an associate 
of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact 
about a person, but all such facts.”151 Yet CSLI information is also 
transmitted to a third party and stored by that party in the ordinary course 
of business.152 
Does the Fourth Amendment apply to this information? Courts have 
answered this complex question by examining the collective knowledge of 
	
145 Id. at 642. A cell phone in “airplane mode” does not communicate with cell towers. Id. at 642–
43. 
146 Id. 
147 Blaze Testimony, supra note 142, at 27. Cell companies can also track users in real time via 
“pinging,” the sending of a signal to a cell phone requesting its coordinates. See L. Scott Harrell, 
Locating Mobile Phones Through Pinging and Triangulation, PURSUIT MAG. (July 1, 2008), 
http://pursuitmag.com/locating-mobile-phones-through-pinging-and-triangulation [https://perma.cc/
E8S9-LF2G]. 
148 Blaze Testimony, supra note 142, at 27; Noam Cohen, It’s Tracking Your Every Move and You 
May Not Even Know, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at A1. 
149 Blaze Testimony, supra note 142, at 27–28. 
150 Freiwald, supra note 125, at 719; see also Suzanne Choney, How Long Do Wireless Carriers 
Keep Your Data?, NBC NEWS (Sep. 29, 2011, 3:05 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/mobile/how-
long-do-wireless-carriers-keep-your-data-f120367 [https://perma.cc/GM5H-6QHT] (describing an 
ACLU FOIA request that revealed general policies on cell tower records but no details on the accuracy 
of information stored). 
151 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
152 See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. 
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cell phone users regarding their locational privacy.153 For example, in each 
of the federal appellate cases that have squarely faced the issue, collective 
knowledge has been a decisive factor in determining the extent of Fourth 
Amendment protection.154 
The Third Circuit held that a cell phone user had not waived his 
privacy in his CSLI, because “it is unlikely that cell phone customers are 
aware that their cell phone providers collect and store historical location 
information.”155 The court reasoned that “[w]hen a cell phone user makes a 
call, the only information that is voluntarily and knowingly conveyed to the 
phone company is the number that is dialed and there is no indication to the 
user that making that call will also locate the caller.”156 
Using collective knowledge as the dispositive factor, the Fifth Circuit 
reached the opposite conclusion. It ruled that “users know that they convey 
information about their location to their service providers when they make 
a call and . . . they voluntarily continue to make such calls,” thereby 
forfeiting any expectation of privacy.157 The court reasoned that cell phone 
	
153 See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d), 42 F. 
Supp. 3d 511, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[S]ubscribers are aware that use of their cell phones necessitates 
disclosure of the information sought.”); In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 
2d 129, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of 
Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)) (“[I]t is clearly within the 
knowledge of cell phone users that their telecommunication carrier, smartphone manufacturer and 
others are aware of the location of their cell phone at any given time.”); United States v. Madison, No. 
11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012) (It is “common knowledge that 
communications companies regularly collect and maintain all types of non-content information 
regarding cell-phone communications, including cell-site tower data, for cell phones for which they 
provide service.”); United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 401 (D. Md. 2012) (“[A]ny 
assumption of ignorance is belied by Sprint/Nextel, Inc.’s privacy policy, which informs its customers 
that it collects location data.” (footnote omitted)); see also Freiwald, supra note 125, at 733–37. 
154 The Sixth Circuit has ruled that police pursuing a person engaged in the transportation of drugs 
may track the transporter’s cell phone without triggering the Fourth Amendment. The court relied on a 
previous Supreme Court case involving the use of a tracking beeper to aid visual surveillance and did 
not find it necessary to address knowledge. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777–78 (6th Cir. 
2012) (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)); United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 950–
51 (6th Cir. 2004). Knowledge plays a prominent role in the Sixth Circuit’s most recent case addressing 
cell phone location information, United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887–88 (6th Cir. 2016). 
155 In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Svc. to Disclose 
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010). 
156 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Affirmance of the District Court at 21, In re Order Directing Elec. Commc’n Svc. 
To Disclose Records, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-4227), 2009 WL 3866619). 
157 In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th Cir. 2013). The 
court made additional, related findings, stating that:  
A cell service subscriber, like a telephone user, understands that his cell phone must send a 
signal to a nearby cell tower in order to wirelessly connect his call. . . . Cell phone users 
recognize that, if their phone cannot pick up a signal (or “has no bars”), they are out of the range 
of their service provider’s network of towers. And they realize that, if many customers in an 
111:139 (2016) Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy  
163 
companies’ terms of service and privacy policies “inform subscribers that 
the providers not only use [CSLI] information, but collect it.”158 The Sixth 
Circuit has similarly concluded that “any cellphone user who has seen her 
phone’s signal strength fluctuate must know that, when she places or 
receives a call, her phone ‘exposes’ its location to the nearest cell tower 
and thus to the company that operates the tower.”159 The Fourth Circuit has 
likewise held that people know they are conveying their location data to 
their cell phone company and therefore have no Fourth Amendment right in 
such data.160 And the Eleventh Circuit has also denied Fourth Amendment 
protection for CSLI, determining that cell phone users “know . . . that cell 
phone companies make records of [their] cell-tower usage.”161 The court 
found that there were sufficient “publicly available facts” regarding CSLI 
that cell phone users could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their location data.162 
In these cases and countless others, courts’ assessments of societal 
knowledge have played a central role in determining whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to new technologies and social contexts. This trend is 
likely to continue, or even to accelerate, as technological change 
increasingly confronts courts with novel Fourth Amendment questions. 
	
area attempt to make calls at the same time, they may overload the network’s local towers, and 
the calls may not go through.  
Id. at 613 (citing Madison, 2012 WL 3095357, at *8). 
158 Id. (citing Madison, 2012 WL 3095357, at *8). 
159 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888 (citing United States v. Davis (Davis II), 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th 
Cir. 2015) (en banc)). The court also found that “any cellphone user who has paid ‘roaming’ (i.e., out-
of-network) charges—or even cellphone users who have not—should know that wireless carriers have 
‘facilities for recording’ locational information and that ‘the phone company does in fact record this 
information for a variety of legitimate business purposes.’” Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 743 (1979)). 
160 United States v. Graham (Graham II), No. 12-4659, 2016 WL 3068018, at *5 (4th Cir. May 31, 
2016) (en banc). This decision reversed a prior panel decision that had reached the opposite conclusion 
about cell users’ knowledge, finding “no reason to suppose that users generally know what cell sites 
transmit their communications or where those cell sites are located.” United States v. Graham (Graham 
I), 796 F.3d 332, 356 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part on reh’g en banc, 2016 WL 3068018 (May 31, 
2016). 
161 Davis II, 785 F.3d at 511. This decision reversed a prior panel decision that came to the 
opposite conclusion about cell users’ knowledge, holding that cell phone users do not knowingly 
disclose their location information to cell phone providers and therefore maintain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their CSLI. United States v. Davis (Davis I), 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 
2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part on reh’g en banc, 785 F.3d 498 (2015).  
162 Davis II, 785 F.3d at 511 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43). 
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III. CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF FOURTH  
AMENDMENT SOCIETAL KNOWLEDGE 
As shown in Part II, courts frequently rely on societal knowledge to 
determine the Fourth Amendment’s scope. Indeed, examining such 
knowledge is an important part of determining whether people have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal information or whether 
they have “knowingly exposed” information to another. However, as this 
Part details, there are fundamental conceptual and practical problems 
inherent in the assessment of Fourth Amendment societal knowledge. 
A. Conceptual Problems 
Attempting to determine what society “knows” about something 
presents several complex conceptual problems. Some of these arise because 
the concept of societal knowledge is itself so difficult to define, let alone 
measure. Others stem from the fact that the populace may rationally limit 
its awareness of even basic information about technology and public 
policy. This section discusses some of the serious conceptual flaws in 
courts’ assessments of societal knowledge. 
1. The Phases of Knowledge.—Knowledge is not a binary, all-or-
nothing concept. There are many layers between being completely ignorant 
of a fact or idea and possessing the detailed understanding of an expert in 
the field. Societal knowledge is even more complex. At any given time, 
different members of society will have different levels of knowledge of a 
particular idea. Some citizens will be completely unaware of the idea, some 
will have a vague familiarity with it, some will comprehend it at a 
superficial level, and some will possess a deep understanding of the idea, 
its context, and its uses. Which of these groups of people have 
“knowledge” of the information in the relevant sense? Although it has not 
been recognized by courts or the Fourth Amendment literature, the 
complexity of knowledge has been discussed in a variety of other areas of 
social science. It has received particular attention in studies on the diffusion 
of innovations and in information and marketing theory. Research in these 
areas has identified several different stages of knowledge.163 
	
163 Similar stages of knowledge are recognized in the social science literature on marketing, 
advertising, and communications. Numerous models of the effects of marketing identify a multistage 
process of acquiring knowledge of a product that encompasses exposure, awareness, perception, 
comprehension, and integration with existing knowledge, among other steps. See, e.g., Thomas E. 
Barry, The Development of the Hierarchy of Effects: An Historical Perspective, 10 CURRENT ISSUES & 
RES. ADVERT. 251, 263–66 (1987) (reviewing studies tracking consumers’ purchasing and 
decisionmaking habits, measuring the effectiveness of advertisements, and considering the tension 
between buyers’ beliefs and behavior).  
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At the most basic level is an awareness of some idea or thing, for 
instance a new product.164 An individual at this stage has heard of the new 
product. If asked, she may recall that it exists, but she lacks details 
concerning it. She may know only its name but not what the “product is, 
what it will do, or how it will work.”165 For example, an individual in 2005 
might see a news report on Facebook, but may not know what it does or 
even what a social network is. 
A second stage is basic comprehension.166 An individual with basic 
comprehension of a thing would generally know how it works, its basic 
purpose, and the likely consequences of using it.167 For instance, an 
individual in 2007 might know how people generally use Facebook and 
what a social network is. She is far from an expert and lacks some 
important details, but she understands the overall concept of Facebook. 
The final, deepest stage is comprehending a thing’s underlying 
principles.168 In general terms, this would mean understanding the theory 
behind something, knowing why it was developed and why people use it, 
grasping its larger meaning, and integrating it with one’s overall 
understanding of the world.169 An individual in 2009, for instance, could 
develop a relatively sophisticated understanding of how Facebook is 
designed and how people use it. She might appreciate how people use 
Facebook to develop and reinforce social connections, or the strategic ways 
that people present themselves in their profiles, or how Facebook’s features 
are designed to promote deeper engagement and the sharing of detailed 
personal data. 
Because knowledge is complex and multilayered, it can be difficult to 
ascertain how much people actually know about a given idea or fact. Nor is 
it clear which level of knowledge should be required before someone is 
deemed to “knowingly expose” their information or to lack a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.170 Most likely, different levels of knowledge should 
	
164 EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 172–73 (5th ed. 2003). 
165 GEORGE M. BEAL & JOE M. BOHLEN, IOWA COOP. EXTENSION SERV., IOWA STATE UNIV. OF 
SCI. AND TECH., THE DIFFUSION PROCESS, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 18, at 2 (1981), 
http://www.soc.iastate.edu/extension/pub/comm/SP18.pdf [https://perma.cc/HEJ3-X5PL] (reprint of an 
influential early field report on the diffusion of innovations).  
166 See ROGERS, supra note 164, at 173, 199. 
167 Id. at 173.  
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 
206, 210 (1966)) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is 
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); id. at 361–62 (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing 
“reasonable expectations of privacy”). 
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be required in different factual contexts, with a detailed understanding of 
underlying principles necessary in cases where the privacy implications of 
people’s actions are nuanced or complex, while in other cases basic 
comprehension would suffice. Instead, courts’ failures to appreciate the 
multilevel nature of knowledge often lead them to find knowing waiver of 
Fourth Amendment rights on the basis of vague awareness of complex 
ideas.171 
These difficulties are compounded when the inquiry calls for 
assessing societal knowledge, a fluid and dynamic phenomenon. 
Individuals move through the different phases of knowledge in different 
ways. Some will progress quickly to a deep understanding, others will learn 
slowly, and some will never achieve even basic comprehension of a new 
thing.172 This makes societal knowledge complex and unstable, and it can 
also lead to fairness and distributional issues, as Section III.A.4 describes. 
Moreover, as the next Section discusses, some people who are exposed to 
information about a thing will nonetheless fail to become aware of it, let 
alone understand it in depth. 
2. Selective Perception.—Although a great deal of information may 
be available about things like surveillance technologies, police practices, 
and existing laws, people may be predisposed to avoid such information 
where possible. People tend to seek out information that accords with their 
existing attitudes.173 And, consciously or unconsciously, they tend to avoid 
information that conflicts with their existing beliefs.174 
Of course, people may be exposed to information that they do not seek 
as passive consumers of televised or electronic information, or they may 
encounter information accidentally while seeking something else. Yet even 
in these cases, the phenomenon of selective perception may prevent them 
from becoming aware of the information.175 Selective perception refers to 
people’s failure to notice information that causes them emotional 
	
171 See discussion supra Section III.B.1. 
172 Beal & Bohlen, supra note 165, at 4–6 & fig.1; ROGERS, supra note 164, at 267, 282–89. 
173 ROGERS, supra note 164, at 171 (describing “the tendency to interpret communication messages 
in terms of the individual’s existing attitudes and beliefs”); Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and 
Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 917 (2015) (discussing “the human tendency to seek out 
information that confirms (rather than contradicts) a given hypothesis”).  
174 ROGERS, supra note 164, at 171 (describing the phenomenon of “selective exposure,” where 
individuals “consciously or unconsciously avoid messages that are in conflict with their existing 
predispositions”); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 176–78 (1998) (exploring the “widely recognized” phenomenon of 
people “tend[ing] not to seek and perhaps even to avoid information that would be considered 
counterindicative with respect to [favored] hypotheses or beliefs”).  
175 RICKY W. GRIFFIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MANAGEMENT 272 (8th ed. 2016). 
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discomfort or contradicts their prior beliefs.176 If a boss views his favorite 
employee slacking off, for example, he may fail to consciously process 
what he sees. Conversely, if he sees a disliked employee doing the same 
thing, he is more likely to notice the behavior and remember it later.177 
The lesson of selective perception is that one cannot tell what people 
are aware of even if one knows what they have seen or heard. Even non-
disturbing news may escape people’s attention. For example, people may 
fail to perceive information if they are distracted at the time of exposure or 
if they sense that the information is not relevant.178 Selective perception 
may be especially relevant in the Fourth Amendment context because it can 
prevent people from becoming aware of news about threats to their privacy 
from their service providers or government agencies. This news may be 
disturbing to people unaccustomed to thinking of law enforcement or 
internet services as threatening. It might also be unpleasant for any frequent 
internet user to contemplate the various threats to her privacy. People may 
simply not process such troubling news if it is only heard once or quickly 
skimmed in the morning paper. 
3. Rational Ignorance.—Remaining uninformed about basic aspects 
of politics, science, technology, and other aspects of life is rational 
behavior for many people. For example, it is economically rational for the 
average citizen to remain ignorant about politics and government policy, 
because the odds that she could affect the course of public policy via voting 
or other means of political participation are extremely small.179 This 
phenomenon of rational ignorance extends to other areas of life.180 
Consumers rarely collect information about every aspect of their purchase 
decisions. Instead they learn a little bit about the food they eat, the cars 
they drive, and the politicians they support, and assume or ignore the rest.181 
Consistent with rational ignorance, large portions of the public do not 
actually know many “well-known” facts. Only 36% of Americans can 
name all three branches of the United States government, while 35% 
cannot name a single branch.182 Only 27% of Americans know that it takes 
	
176 Id.  
177 Id.  
178 C.H. SANDAGE ET AL., ADVERTISING THEORY AND PRACTICE 116–17, 187–88 (12th ed. 1989).  
179 E.g., GUIDO PINCIONE & FERNANDO R. TESÓN, RATIONAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRATIC 
DELIBERATION: A THEORY OF DISCOURSE FAILURE 14 (2006). 
180 See HOLLEY H. ULBRICH, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 55 (2d ed. 2011). 
181 Id. 
182 ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR., Americans Know Surprisingly Little About Their Government, 
Survey Finds (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-know-
surprisingly-little-about-their-government-survey-finds [https://perma.cc/J62H-3WC9]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
168 
a two-thirds vote of the House and Senate to override a presidential veto.183 
In 2014, only 38% of Americans knew which party controlled the Senate.184 
Americans likewise struggle with basic facts about science. Less than half 
know that electrons are smaller than atoms, according to a poll that asked a 
simple true/false question.185 Only 20% know which gas makes up most of 
the Earth’s atmosphere.186 These are fundamental and widely publicized 
facts, and most people are, quite rationally, ignorant of them. 
It can also be rational to ignore information about police practices or 
surveillance, because consumers are unlikely to have much use for such 
information. Information about surveillance of internet or cell phone 
activity is unlikely to cause consumers to stop using the internet or cell 
phones, because both have become integral parts of most people’s daily 
routine.187 Nor are consumers likely to have the opportunity to partially 
protect their internet or cell phone privacy at a reasonable cost in time or 
effort. Many scholars have noted that “privacy markets” where consumers 
can choose among products based on how well they protect privacy have 
largely failed to function.188 Reasons for this failure include the 
prohibitively high costs of monitoring technology companies for privacy 
infractions and the related lack of a critical mass of privacy-savvy 
consumers.189 As a result, consumers may be unable to use most 
	
183 Id. 
184 Id. (at the time of the survey, it was the Democratic Party).   
185 PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC’S KNOWLEDGE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Apr. 22, 2013), 
http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/22/publics-knowledge-of-science-and-technology 
[https://perma.cc/MES5-ZFS7]. 
186 Id. The answer is nitrogen.  
187 People use the internet for an incredible variety of important activities, which they are unlikely 
to forego even if faced with serious threats of surveillance. See Tokson, supra note 37, at 588–89 
(consumers use the internet for many important purposes, including dating, entertainment, news 
gathering, political discourse, health, sex, and voting, among others). The internet is used by roughly 
84% of all Americans, including nearly all Americans under thirty (96%) and nearly all Americans with 
a college degree (95%). PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS’ INTERNET ACCESS: 2000–2015 (Jun. 26, 
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-2000-2015 [https://perma.cc/ 
X4G7-J9JH]. Similarly, approximately 91% of Americans own a cell phone, and cell phone use is so 
popular that users are worried about overusing them. Rainie, supra note 1; AARON SMITH, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., THE BEST (AND WORST) OF MOBILE CONNECTIVITY (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/11/30/the-best-and-worst-of-mobile-connectivity/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6BPZ-QALL]. For many households (roughly 36% as of 2012), the cell phone is the only phone—and 
as the Supreme Court noted long ago, phones play a “vital role . . . in private communication.” Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); SMITH, supra. 
188 E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Irrational Privacy?, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 241, 242 (2012). 
Note that salient privacy protections can, in some cases, differentiate products and lead to market 
success—perhaps the primary selling point of Snapchat is its (imperfect) privacy-protective features.   
189 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy, Property, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 
2078–79 (2004). Moreover, the steps that consumers can currently take to differentiate among products 
based on privacy protection, like comparing privacy policies, are likely to be prohibitively costly. 
Scholars have estimated that reading privacy policies would result in a time cost to consumers of over 
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information about privacy to their advantage. As with knowledge about 
science or politics, public knowledge about surveillance and privacy threats 
is likely to be counterintuitively low. 
4. The Uneven Distribution of Knowledge.—Knowledge tends to 
disseminate unevenly across a population, as certain groups of individuals 
gain knowledge more quickly than others. This uneven distribution of 
knowledge may raise questions of fundamental fairness in the Fourth 
Amendment context, where courts often attribute the knowledge of the 
average person to a particular criminal suspect.190 
Research on how knowledge spreads has shown that knowledge about 
a new innovation, technology, or service tends to reach people with higher 
levels of education more quickly than those less educated.191 The same is 
true of people of higher social status, income, and wealth.192 This is 
exacerbated by the tendency of innovators, marketers, and scholars to 
ignore persons at the lower strata of education and wealth and focus on 
easier-to-reach elites.193 Demographic gaps in knowledge about science and 
technology may be especially large.194 
Judges, especially federal judges, are well above the median in terms 
of education and wealth.195 They are likely better informed than the average 
person about things like the structure of government and basic political 
	
$700 billion (roughly $3534 per internet user) per year for internet-based policies alone. Aleecia M. 
McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. 
SOC’Y 543, 564–65 (2008). Consumers may also have little incentive to protect against private sector 
surveillance, as opposed to police or government agency surveillance. Private entities that process 
personal information tend to store the information in anonymized form. See, e.g., Tokson, supra note 
37, at 607. Although anonymity is increasingly vulnerable to de-anonymization in the era of Big Data, it 
is likely that consumers will continue to perceive the capture of anonymous data as substantially less 
worrisome than that of easily traceable personal information. See Christopher Slobogin, Government 
Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 tbl. (2008) (poll respondents 
rated anonymous record gathering less intrusive than nonanonymous record gathering). In addition, 
consumers may have little incentive to worry about private sector access to their personal information 
because private sector access tends to be fully automated. Tokson, supra note 37, at 602–09. Although 
consumers generally perceive human observation of their data to be invasive, they are far less 
concerned about automated scanning or the mere storage of their data on third-party servers. Id. at 619–
29.  
190 See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008). 
191 ROGERS, supra note 164, at 174. 
192 Id. at 174, 288, 464–65, 467. 
193 Id. at 456–57. 
194 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC’S KNOWLEDGE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 
185 (describing survey results that demonstrate a strong correlation between education level—college 
attendance in particular—and knowledge about science and technology). 
195 See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, Is There a Constitutional Right to Select the Genes of One’s 
Offspring?, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 243 (2011) (noting that judges are substantially wealthier and better 
educated than the general population). 
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facts.196 They are far more likely to read or be told about government 
surveillance programs and technologies. And they know exponentially 
more than the average person about criminal procedure law and policy. 
Judges are accordingly not well positioned to intuit what most people 
know about their privacy. As discussed above, the level of public 
knowledge about many basic facts is counterintuitively low.197 Judges, who 
rank high in education, wealth, and status, are likely to learn new 
information well before the average person.198 As such, they are especially 
likely to err when using their intuition or experiences to determine what 
people know about new technologies and concepts. Facts that are already 
common knowledge among judges may not yet have reached people of 
average socioeconomic status, and indeed may never reach them.199 
Criminal activity is correlated with lower income, education, and 
social status.200 Moreover, law enforcement investigations often 
disproportionately target low-socioeconomic-status neighborhoods and 
areas.201 If persons targeted by police investigations know less about new 
technologies or surveillance practices than the average American, then 
courts may be systematically overestimating the knowledge of the suspects 
who assert Fourth Amendment protection in criminal cases. For instance, a 
suspect from the lowest quintiles of income, education, and social class 
may lose her case because the judge inaccurately concludes that she 
possessed “common” knowledge about CSLI or email technology. These 
systematically inaccurate attributions of knowledge may, in turn, further 
diminish the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system among 
low-socioeconomic-status groups.202 
Individuals from low-income, education, or social status groups may 
thus be doubly harmed in the law enforcement process. Not only are they 
more likely to be targeted by law enforcement, they are also more likely to 
	
196 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHAT THE PUBLIC KNOWS—IN PICTURES, WORDS, MAPS AND 
GRAPHS (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/04/28/what-the-public-knows-in-pictures-
words-maps-and-graphs [https://perma.cc/86ZY-4B74] (showing that knowledge of basic facts about 
politics and the world is correlated with educational attainment). 
197 See supra Section III.A.3. 
198 See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text. 
199 See ROGERS, supra note 164, at 174, 288, 456, 464–65, 467. 
200 See, e.g., LEE ELLIS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF CRIME CORRELATES 32–42, 60–65 (2009). 
201 See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 871–72 & n.232 (2011). 
202 For a discussion of the problems caused by the perceived illegitimacy of the criminal justice 
system, for example, Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391 
(2000). 
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lose Fourth Amendment protection on the basis of imputed knowledge that 
they do not possess. 
B. Practical and Formal Problems 
The conceptual difficulties inherent in the assessment of societal 
knowledge are not just a problem in the abstract. They frequently result in 
questionable or even provably wrong conclusions about knowledge in 
Fourth Amendment cases. This Section discusses these practical problems, 
the biases that are likely to affect judicial determinations of knowledge, and 
several examples of empirically incorrect conclusions about societal 
knowledge. 
1. Waiver and the Phases of Knowledge.—Courts’ failure to 
recognize the complex, multilevel nature of knowledge often leads them to 
find that people have knowingly waived their Fourth Amendment rights on 
very thin evidence. In many cases, a vague or general awareness of the 
possibility of personal data collection is sufficient to vitiate Fourth 
Amendment rights. For example, the Supreme Court held that dialed 
telephone numbers were not private in part because customers have “some 
awareness” that telephone companies can record their numbers, and 
because many phone books contain a page with text implying that 
companies can track harassing calls.203 
Furthermore, some courts do not require direct evidence of actual 
societal awareness, only the potential for awareness evinced by available 
articles or blog posts.204 The Eleventh Circuit, for instance, ruled that CSLI 
was unprotected by the Fourth Amendment on the basis that there were 
“publicly available facts” about cell towers and cell companies recording 
cell tower usage.205 District courts have reached the same conclusion by 
citing the availability of news articles discussing cell phone tracking.206 
These news sources may not be prominent or widely read, and public 
exposure to the relevant information is likely quite limited.207 Further, many 
people exposed to these news stories may not actually become aware of 
them, let alone understand their content.208 At most, these courts have 
identified a possibility that some people might be aware of certain 
	
203 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979). 
204 See In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 140 & n.19, 146 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding public knowledge of CSLI based in part on a blog post discussing how the 
author tracked down his lost iPhone). 
205 Davis II, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc).  
206 See, e.g., In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 140–41. 
207 See id. 
208 See supra Sections III.A–III.B. 
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information—but the mere potential for awareness is typically not 
sufficient grounds for the waiver of a constitutional right.209 
2. Judicial Intuition and Biases.—Assertions that something is 
“common knowledge”210 or that “[a]ny person . . . knows”211 something are 
essentially empirical claims. Yet courts rarely support such claims with 
evidence and very rarely rely on empirical or poll data on public 
knowledge. Judges’ usual approach is simply to make an intuitive judgment 
about collective knowledge, perhaps based on their knowledge or beliefs at 
the time of decision.212 
This is problematic for several reasons. As discussed above, judges 
are well-informed socioeconomic elites who are likely to systematically 
overestimate societal knowledge.213 Societal knowledge tends to be 
counterintuitively low, and tends to spread more quickly to elites than to 
the average citizen.214 
Moreover, by the time they decide a case, judges will almost certainly 
know about the surveillance technology or practice in question no matter 
how obscure it is—because the parties will have informed them about it in 
detail in pleadings or briefs long before a decision is issued. This acquired 
knowledge is likely to bias judges’ intuitive judgments about societal 
knowledge. Individuals tend to automatically impute their own knowledge 
to other people.215 This is true even when the knowledge is confidential and 
others are extremely unlikely to know it.216 The result is that knowledgeable 
	
209 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (reasoning that signing “a statement which 
contained a typed-in clause stating that [Miranda] had ‘full knowledge’ of his ‘legal rights’” and 
understood that statements he made could be used against him did “not approach the knowing and 
intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights”). A person may affirmatively consent to a 
search in the absence of knowing and intelligent waiver, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
242–43 & n.31 (1973), but there was no consent given in the cases addressed here. It is possible that 
courts could infer consent based on the knowing disclosure of information to third parties, but that 
would require a knowing disclosure, not the mere theoretical possibility of knowledge.   
210 E.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988); In re Application of U.S. for Historical 
Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d), 42 F. Supp. 3d 511, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
211 United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320, 1327 (7th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original), 
abrogated by Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
212 See, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40; California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); United 
States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008).  
213 See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra Sections III.A.3–III.A.4. 
215 See Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know—and Sometimes Misjudge—What Others Know: 
Imputing One’s Own Knowledge to Others, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 737, 745–49 (1999) (gathering various 
studies indicating that people’s estimates of what others know are systematically biased by what the 
estimators themselves know). 
216 See Boaz Keysar et al., States of Affairs and States of Mind: The Effect of Knowledge of Beliefs, 
64 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 283, 284 (1995) (“[P]eople’s tendency to 
111:139 (2016) Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy  
173 
people overestimate, often severely, what others know.217 Judges deciding 
Fourth Amendment cases based on their intuitions about knowledge are 
likely susceptible to the same biases.218 
More generally, decisions based on empirical data are likely to be 
sounder and more accurate than decisions based on guesses about an 
empirical matter. Other scholars have criticized the Supreme Court for 
failing to seek out empirical data on citizens’ future expectations of 
privacy, so I will not dwell on this point.219 It is worth noting, however, 
how much more force this critique has in the context of an inquiry into 
knowledge. The reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry arguably 
contains a normative as well as an empirical element. It can be construed to 
ask not only what people do expect in the future but what they have a right 
to expect.220 But courts assessing collective knowledge are making a more 
straightforward empirical determination: what people know in the present 
day. Courts drawing empirical conclusions about societal knowledge 
without any empirical evidence is thus especially troubling. It is also 
particularly dangerous, because courts’ empirical assertions may be proven 
wrong by new evidence. If the empirical conclusions about collective 
knowledge that form the basis for many Fourth Amendment decisions turn 
out to be incorrect, the result may be instability and unpredictability in 
Fourth Amendment law and further harm to the legitimacy of the justice 
system. 
3. Empirical Data on Societal Knowledge.—There is a dearth of 
empirical information on the extent of societal knowledge about 
surveillance practices or new technologies. However, the studies that do 
exist indicate that courts have decided several important Fourth 
	
behave as if others have access to their own privileged information—even when they are fully aware 
they do not”).  
217 Id. at 283–84; Nickerson, supra note 215, at 745–49. 
218 See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784, 829 (2001) (describing the results of a study indicating that 
judges are likely to exhibit the same biases as non-judges). Further, societal knowledge may itself 
change over the several years that it may take for a case to be resolved, especially if the case goes 
through one or more rounds of appeals. A new technology that was largely unknown at the time of the 
initial police search might be well known by the time an appeals court rules on the constitutionality of 
the search.  
219 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 757–58 (1993). 
220 See LEE, supra note 73, at 238–42; Kerr, supra note 19, at 507–22. Nonetheless, the most 
common application of the Katz test is simply to inquire about society’s actual expectations of privacy. 
See Simmons, supra note 125, at 586 n.108.  
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Amendment cases on the basis of demonstrably erroneous conclusions 
about societal knowledge. 
a. User knowledge and the internet.—Courts have held that 
internet users have relatively detailed knowledge about how the internet 
works, how emails are processed and monitored, and how ISPs collect and 
store personal information.221 Studies examining people’s actual knowledge 
of internet data privacy suggest that courts are substantially overestimating 
such knowledge.222 For example, a recent Consumer Reports poll found that 
61% of internet users incorrectly think that what they do online is never 
shared without their permission, while 57% erroneously think that 
companies gathering internet data must identify themselves and indicate 
why they are collecting data and whether they intend to share it with other 
organizations.223 Courts should be cautious in assuming that internet users 
understand that ISPs may collect their personal or web surfing information. 
Many courts rely on consumers’ supposed knowledge of ISP privacy 
policies addressing the collection or sharing of personal data. They 
conclude that knowledge of policies that permit data gathering “may well 
extinguish [a user’s] reasonable expectation of privacy.”224 Courts have 
relied on privacy policies to determine the extent of user knowledge in 
cases involving email content,225 web surfing activity,226 subscriber 
information,227 and cell phone location data.228 But courts’ assumption that 
users are at least generally aware of the contents of their privacy polices is 
empirically incorrect. In fact, users are very unlikely to read their privacy 
policies, and most users do not understand what a “privacy policy” is.229 
	
221 See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that internet 
users know that their email and IP addresses are used by third parties to route internet information); 
United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (per curiam) 
(stating that an internet user knowingly revealed his subscriber information to his ISP and its 
employees). 
222 See infra notes 223–35 and accompanying text. 
223 Poll: Consumers Concerned About Internet Privacy, CONSUMERSUNION.ORG (Sept. 25, 2008), 
https://consumersunion.org/news/poll-consumers-concerned-about-internet-privacy 
[https://perma.cc/MHJ2-5UKW]. 
224 Warshak I, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc on ripeness grounds, Warshak 
II, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008). This assumption about user knowledge dates back to Smith v. 
Maryland, where the Supreme Court assumed that telephone users were aware of the contents of a 
“Consumer Information” page in most telephone books. 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979).  
225 E.g., Warshak III, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010). 
226 E.g., United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). 
227 United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (D. Md. 2005). 
228 E.g., In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613 (5th Cir. 2013). 
229 See infra notes 230–35 and accompanying text. 
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A privacy policy is a statement that discloses a company’s policy on 
collecting and using personal information.230 Yet the majority of internet 
users (55–59%) erroneously believe that the existence of any “privacy 
policy” means that their information will be kept private.231 These users 
likely feel that they have no reason to read the contents of privacy 
policies.232 Furthermore, even sophisticated users are unlikely to read 
privacy policies because reading privacy policies would be prohibitively 
laborious. Scholars have estimated that reading internet-based privacy 
policies alone would take roughly 244 hours annually for each internet 
user.233 Very few internet users—about 3% in one survey and 1.4% in 
another—report reading most privacy policies or user agreements (which 
often contain privacy policies).234 A study of visitors to certain software 
retail websites revealed that only 0.14% of those who purchased software 
read or skimmed the applicable user agreement.235 
In short, there is no empirical evidence that people are aware of the 
contents of their privacy policies, and substantial evidence to the contrary. 
The numerous, often important court cases that rely on privacy policies as a 
barometer of consumer knowledge are premised on a highly questionable 
assumption.236 
b. User knowledge and location surveillance.—Numerous courts 
have decided cell phone location tracking cases based on assessments of 
societal knowledge. A majority of federal courts have concluded that most 
people know that cell phone companies regularly record information about 
	
230 Joseph Turow et al., The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Privacy in the Coming 
Decade, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 723, 731 (2007–2008) (explaining what privacy policies 
disclose).  
231 Id. at 735.  
232 Id. at 747. 
233 McDonald & Cranor, supra note 189, at 563. 
234 Turow et al., supra note 230, at 740; Brief for Kelly Caine et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners’ Motion of Objection to March 11, 2011 Order Denying Motion to Vacate and Denying in 
Part Motion to Unseal at 4, In re Application of U.S. for Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. 
Supp. 2d 114 (E.D. Va. 2011) (Misc. Nos. 11-DM-00003 & 10GJ3793). 
235 Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine 
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20 (2014) (finding that 7 
out of 4866 purchasers read or skimmed the applicable user agreement). Further, for those who 
accessed the agreements, the median viewing time was only sixty seconds. Id.  
236 See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613 (5th Cir. 
2013) (finding that users know that cell phone companies gather and store data about their location 
based on privacy policies); Warshak III, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a user’s 
expectation of privacy in her email content turned on the applicable privacy policy); see also Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979) (finding that telephone users know the contents of the 
informational material in telephone books). 
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users’ locations.237 Accordingly, these courts hold that cell phone users 
have knowingly exposed their location data and therefore forfeited any 
Fourth Amendment protection.238 But courts’ assertions about societal 
knowledge are not based on empirical data—indeed little direct empirical 
data exists about people’s knowledge of cell phone technology and 
surveillance. To fill this gap and assess the accuracy of courts’ assertions 
about collective knowledge of cell phone technology, I conducted a survey 
of 810 cell phone users. The survey’s findings cast doubt on the validity of 
the majority of cell phone location tracking cases. 
A sample of 810 adult cell phone users living in the United States was 
recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service.239 Four respondents 
were excluded for failure to plausibly answer a screening question.240 This 
sample was not census-weighted, and was younger, more male, and had 
slightly higher levels of educational attainment than the general U.S. 
population.241 The gender of 46.5% of respondents was female. The age of 
	
237 See, e.g., Davis II, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“[C]ell users know . . . that 
users when making or receiving calls are necessarily conveying or exposing to their service provider 
their general location within that cell tower’s range, and that cell phone companies make records of 
cell-tower usage.”); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d), 42 F. 
Supp. 3d 511, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[S]ubscribers are aware that use of their cell phones necessitates 
disclosure of the information sought.”); In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 
2d 129, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing In re Application of U.S. for Order Authorizing Release of 
Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)) (“[I]t is clearly within the 
knowledge of cell phone users that their telecommunication carrier, smartphone manufacturer and 
others are aware of the location of their cell phone at any given time.”); United States v. Madison, No. 
11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012) (It is “common knowledge that 
communications companies regularly collect and maintain all types of non-content information 
regarding cell-phone communications, including cell-site tower data, for cell phones for which they 
provide service.”).  
238 See, e.g., Davis II, 785 F.3d at 511 (determining that cell phone users’ knowledge of how cell 
phones work means that they lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location information); In 
re Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d), 42 F. Supp. 3d at 517–18 
(holding that cell phone users’ awareness of the disclosure of their cell phone information undermines 
any Fourth Amendment protection for such information).  
239 For more details on Mechanical Turk’s survey recruiting service, see generally Michael 
Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of 
Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSPS. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 (2011). The website is frequently 
used to conduct surveys by legal scholars and social scientists. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman & Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 409–10 (2013) 
(reporting a survey on preferences for warranties and liquidated damages clauses in contracts); Stuart P. 
Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Public Perceptions of White Collar Crime Culpability: Bribery, Perjury, 
and Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41–42 (2012) (reporting a survey on the perceived 
blameworthiness and preferred punishments for different bribery scenarios).  
240 The question asked the name of their current cell phone service provider.  
241 In a recent study using Mechanical Turk, survey respondents were younger, more male, and had 
higher preferences for privacy than the general population. Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Strahilevitz, 
Surveillance Duration Doesn’t Affect Privacy Expectations: An Empirical Test of the Mosaic Theory 47 
(Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law & Economics No. 727, 2015), 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2419&context=law_and_economics 
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43.8% of respondents was thirty-five or older.242 The highest level of 
education for 9.6% of respondents was a graduate degree, 37.1% a 
bachelor’s degree, 15.8% an associate’s degree, and 37.1% a high school 
degree. The household income of 58.4% of respondents was below 
$50,000.243 
Contrary to courts’ conclusions about collective knowledge of cell 
phone tracking, this survey indicates that the majority of cell phone users 
do not know that their cell phone provider collects their location data, and 
roughly 15% of users affirmatively believe that their data is not collected. 
Participants were asked whether their cell phone service provider regularly 
collects information on their physical location using their cell phone.244 
Nearly three-quarters of participants (73.5%) answered either “No” 
(15.0%) or “I Don’t Know” (58.5%) to this question, compared to 26.5% 
who answered “Yes.” Moreover, most of the 213 respondents who 
answered “Yes” referred to GPS or Google Maps in a follow-up 
explanation, while only 27 respondents referenced anything that could be 
construed as involving cell site location tracking.245 This suggests that very 
few users (only 3.3% of all respondents) are aware of the cell site location 
information at issue in most cell phone surveillance cases. 
	
[https://perma.cc/JE8E-CDMU]. Assuming that this Article’s sample has similarly high privacy 
preferences, the overall sample may have sought more information about potential threats to privacy 
than the general population. However, the survey respondents here were generally not knowledgeable 
about CSLI and did not read their privacy policies. The general population may be even less informed.  
242 In total, 56.2% of respondents were between ages 18–34, 36.2% were between ages 35–54, and 
7.6% were over age 55. In the general U.S. population as of 2010, 50.8% of people were female, and 
the median age was 37.2. LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND 
SEX COMPOSITION: 2010, at 2 & tbls.1 & 2 (May 2011), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC4G-MVT2]. 
243 In the general U.S. population age 25 or older, the highest level of educational attainment for 
12.0% of people was an advanced degree, 20.5% a bachelor’s degree, 9.8% an associate’s degree, and 
46.1% a high school degree. See CAMILLE L. RYAN & KURT BAUMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 2 tbl.1, (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p20-578.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MGE3-GCVN]. In the U.S., 46.8% of households had an income below $50,000 in 
2014. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
SUPPLEMENT, at tbl. HINC-06 (2015), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-
poverty/cps-hinc/hinc-06.html [https://perma.cc/3Y6V-P5BX].  
244 The exact phrasing was “Does your cell phone service provider regularly collect information on 
your physical location using your cell phone?” This question was phrased broadly enough to encompass 
GPS tracking as well as cell site location recording, and thus responses may overestimate societal 
knowledge about cell site location tracking.  
245 Participants who responded “Yes” when asked about location tracking were given an open-
ended prompt that asked, “Please describe how your cell phone service collects information on your 
physical location.” Any response that could reasonably be interpreted as referring to CSLI was coded as 
doing so. Such responses varied widely in terms of detail, from “collects via making call” to “It can 
approximate my location by determining which cell tower is being used, which would be the cell tower 
closest to me.” 
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TABLE 1: SURVEY RESPONSES, CELL PHONE LOCATION TRACKING 
Does your cell phone provider regularly collect information on  
your physical location using your cell phone? 
Yes No I Don’t Know 
26.5% 15.0% 58.5% 
TABLE 2: FOLLOW-UP QUESTION FOR RESPONDENTS ANSWERING YES 
Please describe how your cell phone service collects information  
on your physical location. 
Answer could be construed as  
referring to CSLI 
Answer could not be construed as 
referring to CSLI 
12.7% 87.3% 
 
Further, and contrary to the assumptions of several courts in location 
tracking cases,246 the vast majority (89.8%) of respondents reported that 
they have not read or skimmed in detail their cell phone service’s privacy 
policy. By contrast, 7.3% report that they have skimmed the policy in 
detail, and 2.9% say they have read all or most of it.247  
  
	
246 See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613 (5th Cir. 
2013) (footnote omitted) (noting that privacy policies “inform subscribers” that providers use “a 
subscriber’s location information to route his cell phone calls [and] collect it”); United States v. 
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 401 (D. Md. 2012) (“[A]ny assumption of ignorance is belied by 
Sprint/Nextel, Inc.’s privacy policy, which informs its customers that it collects location data.”).  
247 Nearly half of respondents (46.7%) reported skimming their privacy policy briefly, and 43.1% 
reported that they were unaware of it, did not want to read it, or were unable to access it. Participants 
were initially asked “Have you read your cell phone service provider’s official privacy policy?”  
 Note that privacy policies are generally written in dense, legalistic language unlikely to be 
understood even by internet users who skim policies in depth. See Carlos Jensen & Colin Potts, Privacy 
Policies as Decision-Making Tools: An Evaluation of Online Privacy Notices, in 6 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 471, 475 (2004).   
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TABLE 3: SURVEY RESPONSES, PRIVACY POLICIES 
Have you read your cell phone service provider’s 
official privacy policy? 
I have read all or 
most of it 
I have skimmed it 
in a detailed 
manner 
I have skimmed  
it briefly 
I was unaware of 
it, did not want to 
read it, or was 
unable to access it 
2.9% 7.3% 46.7% 43.1% 
 
This is this first study to directly measure cell phone users’ knowledge 
of location tracking, and there remains a need for additional surveys to 
confirm its results. But the results of the study suggest that many courts 
have imputed knowledge about cell phone technology and surveillance 
practices that users do not possess. This is not the result of any doctrinal 
error—these courts are amply supported by precedent when they look to 
collective knowledge to determine the Fourth Amendment’s scope.248 
Rather, the problems inherent in the search for societal knowledge and the 
practical difficulties of assessing it have combined to lead judges astray in 
the majority of federal cell phone tracking cases. If this trend continues, the 
Fourth Amendment’s boundaries will be drawn based on empirical 
conclusions that are deeply flawed. 
C. Improving the Assessment of Societal Knowledge 
Courts could, in theory, take a far more empirical approach to 
determining societal knowledge in Fourth Amendment cases. They could 
rely on surveys that measure people’s knowledge of relevant technologies 
or surveillance techniques rather than relying on intuition or the contents of 
privacy policies. This would likely produce more accurate conclusions 
about societal knowledge than courts’ current approaches. 
In addition, surveys designed primarily to test knowledge rather than 
evaluate opinions would likely avoid many of the drawbacks of standard 
opinion polls. Surveys often ask people for positions on issues that they 
	
248 See, e.g., Davis II, 785 F.3d 498, 511–12 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (drawing a direct parallel to 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). 
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have never considered in any depth.249 People will do their best to give an 
answer, but their answer may not reflect a meaningful opinion on the issue. 
Accordingly, public poll responses often do not match people’s behavior.250 
Relatedly, when people do not have firm opinions on an issue, their 
responses may vary substantially based on the perspective of the question 
asked.251 This can result in opinion polls on the same issue producing 
contradictory results.252 Thus public ignorance or ambivalence can 
undermine opinion polls, especially those addressing complex or subtle 
issues.253 By contrast, surveys that quiz people to determine whether they 
know something are less vulnerable to these framing effects. Further, 
public ignorance about a topic cannot undermine knowledge-focused 
surveys—public ignorance is exactly what these surveys seek to measure. 
In practice, courts deciding novel Fourth Amendment cases are often 
unable to rely on survey data because scholars or pollsters rarely collect 
such data until after several courts, and often the Supreme Court, have 
already weighed in on the issue. This might be mitigated through 
unconventional measures like providing federal courts with a budget to 
conduct surveys of public knowledge through polling services like Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, Toluna, or Qualtrics. The decreasing cost of obtaining 
survey data may also encourage scholars to regularly collect and publish 
data on public knowledge of privacy-relevant technologies and issues.254 
To whatever extent they are available, the increased use of empirical 
studies of public knowledge would likely improve the quality and validity 
of courts’ Fourth Amendment decisions. But even if courts could improve 
their assessments of knowledge, there are potentially serious flaws inherent 
in a knowledge-based Fourth Amendment regime. The next Part examines 
whether, even if courts could better assess societal knowledge, they should 
nonetheless abandon the use of societal knowledge as a determinant of the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope. 
	
249 See, e.g., John Zaller & Stanley Feldman, A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering 
Questions Versus Revealing Preferences, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 579, 579–80 (1992). 
250 See Solove, supra note 25, at 1522–23.  
251 See Zaller & Feldman, supra note 249, at 582–83, 585. 
252 See, e.g., id. at 581–83 (describing studies where different orderings of the same questions 
produced substantially different results and where the same respondents gave different answers in 
surveys given only months apart). 
253 Id. at 582–84. 
254 Cf. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 241 (reporting results of surveys asking respondents about 
their expectations of privacy in certain situations). As part of their project, Kugler and Strahilevitz hope 
to collect and publish additional relevant data annually. Id. at 27 n.136. 
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IV. KNOWLEDGE AND THE EROSION OF THE  FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 Assessing societal knowledge in the Fourth Amendment context is 
fraught with difficulty. Empirical evidence indicates that courts have badly 
overestimated societal knowledge in a variety of areas.255 But such failure is 
not inevitable, at least in theory.256 This Part considers whether even 
accurate assessments of societal knowledge should play a role in setting the 
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment. 
A. The Importance of Knowledge Gaps Under Current Law 
 Knowledge of a new concept or fact often spreads slowly, passing 
from person to person through social networks and political hierarchies.257 
It may take years for most people to learn about new information, and 
many ideas will never reach a majority of the population.258 
As threats to privacy continue to proliferate, these gaps in collective 
knowledge offer a zone of privacy protection under the knowledge-based 
Katz inquiry. If anything, knowledge’s role in Fourth Amendment law is 
likely to grow as surveillance technologies advance and private entities are 
able to collect, process, and store new types of personal information.259 In a 
world where private entities can access emails, web surfing data, files in 
cloud storage, detailed location information, and video feeds from millions 
of sources, users’ lack of detailed knowledge about threats to their privacy 
may be the primary remaining source of reasonable privacy expectations. 
As discussed above, public knowledge is often remarkably low, and 
the average person may rationally fail to become aware of publicly 
available and potentially useful information.260 A Fourth Amendment based 
on citizens’ lack of knowledge is not inherently unworkable. People will 
remain ignorant about the collection of their personal information and other 
threats to their privacy, even when such information is known to privacy 
experts or informed elites. But such a regime—which Fourth Amendment 
law is increasingly coming to resemble—is inherently unstable. Not only 
does it risk inconsistent and unfair results, but its protections are also likely 
to shrink over time as people become more knowledgeable about 
technology and surveillance. 
	
255 See supra Section III.B.2. 
256 See supra Section III.C. 
257 See BEAL & BOHLEN, supra note 165, at 3–4.  
258 See, e.g., ROGERS, supra note 164, at 1–5, 171–72, 227–28.  
259 For a discussion of the rapid advance of surveillance technology and private entities’ extensive 
access to citizens’ personal information, see Ohm, supra note 130, at 1310. 
260 See supra Section III.A.3. 
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B. Rapid Changes in Societal Knowledge 
Public knowledge about a given threat to privacy can spike 
dramatically due to unpredictable events. High-salience news stories that 
involve new technologies or surveillance techniques may rapidly 
disseminate privacy-relevant information to the public.261 For example, the 
O.J. Simpson case may have sharply increased public awareness of DNA 
blood testing techniques.262 But the incidence and timing of national news 
stories that reveal privacy-relevant information can be very difficult to 
predict. 
Likewise, public ignorance about threats to privacy can be 
undermined by leaks from government or private actors. An especially 
high-profile leak, like Edward Snowden’s release of NSA documents 
detailing various mass surveillance programs, may sharply increase public 
awareness of privacy threats, potentially leading to changes in societal 
expectations of privacy.263 Yet many revelations about privacy threats will 
fail to capture public attention. National newspapers reported on the 
existence of the NSA’s massive telephone metadata collection program as 
early as 2006.264 But the program did not garner widespread media attention 
	
261 See sources and discussion infra note 263.  
262 DNA blood testing played a major role in the O.J. Simpson trial, which was followed closely by 
large segments of the American public. See, e.g., GALLUP–CNN/USA TODAY, The O.J. Simpson Trial: 
Opinion Polls, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Simpson/polls.html 
[https://perma.cc/YR7U-D98J] (reporting that a 1995 Gallup poll found that 80% of Americans 
watched the Simpson trial verdict).  
263 A May 2014 poll found that 71% of Americans had seen, read, or heard news coverage about 
Edward Snowden, with 38% having seen a lot and 33% having seen just some. HART RESEARCH 
ASSOCIATES/PUBLIC OPINION STRATEGIES, NBC NEWS NATIONAL SURVEY (May 27–29, 2014), 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/A_Politics/14353%20May%20NBC%20News%20Nat
ional%20Survey%20Interview%20Schedule.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UMA-UC54]. Familiarity with such 
programs remains high in 2015, with 87% of people reporting awareness of the government’s telephone 
and internet surveillance programs, 31% having heard a lot about it, and 56% having heard at least a 
little. LEE RAINIE & MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS’ PRIVACY STRATEGIES POST-
SNOWDEN  (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/americans-privacy-strategies-post-
snowden [https://perma.cc/S9LV-ZS49].  
 It remains unclear whether revelations about government surveillance programs, as opposed to 
private surveillance practices, can themselves erode people’s reasonable expectations of privacy. The 
Supreme Court has said that the police cannot destroy expectations of privacy by simply announcing 
that they will henceforth conduct random searches of people’s homes. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 740–41 n.5 (1979). However, the Court has often found that noncriminal government surveillance 
practices can reduce people’s reasonable expectations of privacy. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 
471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (finding that public expectations of privacy in cars are reduced because of 
public knowledge of the government’s extensive regulation of cars). One possibility is that government 
surveillance programs that are deemed justifiable on national security grounds may be leveraged to 
reduce Fourth Amendment protections against domestic police surveillance. 
264 Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY (May 11, 
2006, 10:38 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Y9U9-9F3G]. 
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until news of the program became associated with the dramatic details of 
Snowden’s pilfering classified documents and fleeing the United States.265 
As with high-profile celebrity criminal cases, predicting when government 
or private actors will leak sensitive information or when such leaks will 
capture the media’s attention would be virtually impossible. 
Accordingly, the protections afforded by a knowledge-based Fourth 
Amendment regime are inherently unstable and the loss of Fourth 
Amendment protection unpredictable. The results produced by such a 
regime are also normatively unappealing. As discussed above, courts have 
relied heavily on assessments of knowledge in resolving the important 
question whether the Fourth Amendment protects people’s cell site location 
information (CSLI).266 Such information can reveal so much intimate 
information about a person’s life at such low cost that it risks “alter[ing] the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to 
democratic society.”267 As the survey discussed in Section III.B.3 indicates, 
public knowledge of CSLI is currently very low, despite the profusion of 
federal and state criminal cases that involve cellular location tracking. Yet 
public knowledge could easily spike if CSLI evidence were a key part of 
the criminal case against a major celebrity or notorious criminal.268 It is odd 
to say that the government should be able to warrantlessly track citizens’ 
locations and obtain intimate details about their lives because a major news 
story happened to involve CSLI. This is reinforced by the fact that, even 
with increased awareness, consumers are unlikely to stop using their cell 
phones and may be unable to effectively prevent privacy invasions.269 Such 
	
265 See supra note 263. 
266 See supra Section II.E. 
267 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United 
States v. Cuevas–Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 
1534 (mem.) (2012)); see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[One] 
who knows all of another’s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a 
regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband . . . an associate of particular individuals or political groups—
and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.”); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 
1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of which 
takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the 
AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union 
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.”).  
268 Public knowledge might also increase substantially if a previous crime case became the subject 
of a hit movie. This is not entirely hypothetical, as producers have explored making the popular podcast 
Serial, which discussed police use of cell phone location data, into a movie. See Joanna Robinson, 
Hollywood Wants to Make a Movie Out of Serial. But Should They?, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 20, 2014, 1:09 
PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/11/serial-made-into-a-movie [https://perma.cc/
KM7F-7T75].  
269 See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. In addition, the use of cell phone signals to 
locate cell phone users is a fundamental part of cellular phone systems. See supra Section II.E.1. 
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a major decision about the relationship between the government and its 
citizens should not turn on chance events. 
C. The Expansion of Societal Knowledge 
Societal knowledge is also a problematic basis for Fourth Amendment 
scope because knowledge about technology and surveillance practices is 
likely to increase over time. As people become better informed about 
threats to their privacy and the exposure of their information to others, their 
reasonable expectations of privacy will diminish.270 This dynamic also 
makes it difficult to protect privacy through education or political action 
because, paradoxically, informing citizens about privacy threats can lead to 
reduced constitutional protection. Over time, a Fourth Amendment based 
on collective knowledge will shrink in scope, protecting ever fewer types 
of personal information and becoming increasingly irrelevant to the 
regulation of police behavior. 
Available evidence suggests that technology knowledge is growing 
and will continue to grow as millennials and their successor generations 
replace older generations. Numerous studies report that younger people, 
especially the “digital natives” who have lived their entire lives in the 
internet age, know more about new technologies and computers than older 
people.271 Young Americans are more likely to use the internet, to own 
smartphones, and to use smartphones for a wide variety of tasks like online 
banking, researching a health condition, and GPS navigation.272 Younger 
demographic groups have also been shown to read technology news at 
higher rates than older groups.273 Societal knowledge of technology will 
	
270 To be sure, many people will remain rationally ignorant about privacy threats and new 
technologies. But for the reasons set out in this Section, people are increasingly likely to acquire 
technology knowledge for nonprivacy purposes, and such knowledge may also inform them of privacy 
threats. Nor does rational ignorance entirely prevent citizens from acquiring information about their 
government or the world around them—many people just like to know, even if they are unlikely to 
profit from the knowledge. 
271 See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC’S KNOWLEDGE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra 
note 185 (noting that younger Americans are more aware of nanotechnology and how lasers work than 
older Americans); PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC KNOWS BASIC FACTS ABOUT POLITICS, ECONOMICS, 
BUT STRUGGLES WITH SPECIFICS (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.people-press.org/2010/11/18/public-
knows-basic-facts-about-politics-economics-but-struggles-with-specifics [https://perma.cc/7KQ7-
5GF5] (explaining poll finding that younger people are over three times as likely to identify Android as 
Google’s smartphone operating system as older people).  
272 PEW RESEARCH CTR., INTERNET USER DEMOGRAPHICS (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/internet-use/latest-stats [https://perma.cc/3ND3-EKC5]; Aaron 
Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/ [https://perma.cc/ETR8-ZWJT]. 
273 PEW RESEARCH CTR., 2008 PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS NEWS 
CONSUMPTION AND BELIEVABILITY STUDY 49, http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/444.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M53J-J4AZ]. 
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likely grow as these younger citizens replace the less tech-savvy baby 
boomers and as even more tech-literate generations are born. 
More broadly, it is also likely that Americans’ inherent capacity for 
knowledge will continue to increase over time. The citizens of advanced 
nations including the United States have experienced massive gains in IQ 
over the past century. From the early 1900s to the present day, Americans 
have gained roughly three to five IQ points per decade on standard tests.274 
Americans’ educational attainment has also increased dramatically since 
the mid-twentieth century. In 1940, 75.9% of Americans over twenty-four 
had less than a high school education, 19.6% had completed high school or 
some college, and 4.6% had a bachelor’s degree or higher. In 2015, only 
11.7% of Americans over twenty-four had less than a high school degree, 
56.4% had completed high school or some college, and 32.0% had a 
bachelor’s degree or higher.275 Studies have found that education is the 
strongest demographic predictor of knowledge about science and 
technology, with college-educated individuals substantially more 
knowledgeable than those with no college experience.276 
In addition, the internet and other new communication technologies 
may lower the cost of acquiring information and increase the rate at which 
new information can disseminate throughout a population.277 Not only can 
the internet facilitate mass communication, but it also decreases the costs of 
one-on-one communication and small-group communication over long 
distances.278 
Awareness may also grow due to people’s increasing interaction with 
information-collecting technologies. For instance, targeted emails, online 
	
274 James R. Flynn, Are We Really Getting Smarter?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2012, 9:10 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444032404578006612858486012 [https://perma.cc/
U6MT-BC9K].  
275 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PERCENT OF POPULATION AGE 25 AND OVER BY EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT: 1940–2015, at fig.2, http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/ 
historical/fig2.jpg [https://perma.cc/3ULD-ECPA]. The rise in education levels has continued over the 
past decade. For instance, the number of men earning advanced degrees increased 27.1% from 2005 to 
2015, and the number of women with advanced degrees rose 55.4%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,  PERCENT 
CHANGE FROM 2005 TO 2015 IN THE NUMBER OF MEN AND WOMEN 25 AND OVER WHO HAVE 
COMPLETED SELECTED LEVELS OF EDUCATION, at fig.3, http://www.census.gov/ 
hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/historical/fig3.jpg [https://perma.cc/45DG-2WNM]. Note that some 
of this increase is the result of population growth, which was about 8.4% over the same time period. 
WORLD BANK, DATA: UNITED STATES, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states 
[https://perma.cc/4CNZ-H3CM]. 
276 PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC’S KNOWLEDGE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 185. 
277 ROGERS, supra note 164, at 216.  
278 Id. Rates of internet use are high in America, at roughly 87.4%. WORLD BANK, INTERNET 
USERS (PER 100 PEOPLE), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2 [https://perma.cc/
BSW6-XGLZ]. 
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advertisements, and advertisements that reference internet users’ prior 
purchases will raise awareness that online behavior is tracked and 
recorded.279 To be sure, most people are unlikely to know the details of how 
their information is collected or tracked.280 But even general knowledge has 
often been sufficient to eliminate Fourth Amendment protection.281 Such 
general societal awareness about new technologies and surveillance 
techniques is likely to increase as information-collection practices 
proliferate. 
To be sure, as new technologies and surveillance techniques are 
developed, new gaps in societal knowledge will arise that may provide the 
basis for Fourth Amendment protection under the current test.282 But as 
people become more intelligent, better educated, better informed about 
science and technology, and have better access to new information, these 
gaps will close ever more rapidly. 
A knowledge-based Fourth Amendment also makes it more difficult 
to protect privacy through political activism, because educating citizens 
about privacy threats may itself lead to diminished constitutional 
protection. This places privacy advocates in something of a double bind. 
Educating citizens about threats to their privacy may help them to take 
steps to protect their personal information from government surveillance. 
Likewise, raising awareness about surveillance is a crucial first step 
towards generating political momentum for legislative privacy 
protections.283 But the more that citizens are informed of government 
	
279 Leary, supra note 5, at 367. 
280 Id. 
281 See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612–13 (5th Cir. 
2013) (citing United States v. Madison, No. 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 
2012)) (finding no Fourth Amendment protection for CSLI because “[a] cell service subscriber . . . 
understands that his cell phone must send a signal to a nearby cell tower in order to wirelessly connect 
his call”); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no Fourth Amendment 
protection for email or IP addresses because users should know that this information is used by their 
ISPs).  
282 See supra Section IV.A. 
283 There are currently several pro-privacy groups engaged in awareness raising and general 
advocacy efforts in support of proposed legislation. Yet these efforts may be counterproductive if they 
raise awareness of privacy threats but fail to result in effective legislative privacy protection.  
 The ACLU is currently leading an effort in sixteen states to pass legislation that protects internet 
privacy as part of its #TakeCTRL legislative program. Jose Pagliery, ACLU Unveils Privacy Fight in 16 
States, CNN MONEY (Jan. 21, 2016, 11:53 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/20/technology/aclu-
state-privacy-laws [https://perma.cc/S2UC-N9LY]. The Electronic Frontier Foundation promotes pro-
privacy student activism and engages in several educational and awareness-raising efforts. See About 
EFF, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about [https://perma.cc/32VP-2NN4]. The 
Electronic Privacy Information Center “educates the public and policymakers through the documents 
[obtained] through FOIA litigation.” EPIC Domestic Surveillance Project, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. 
CTR., https://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance [https://perma.cc/U2NB-E5GA]. 
111:139 (2016) Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy  
187 
surveillance programs and other threats to their privacy, the less likely they 
are to reasonably expect privacy in their personal information.284 Grassroots 
efforts to support pro-privacy legislation are accordingly fraught with peril 
under the current legal regime. If they are unsuccessful, not only do they 
fail to enact new legislative privacy protections, but they may erode 
existing constitutional protections by increasing societal awareness of 
privacy threats. 
Increases in knowledge about threats to privacy are especially 
problematic because of the low likelihood that such knowledge will 
motivate individuals to curtail their use of cell phones or the internet. As 
discussed above, these technologies have become integral parts of daily 
life.285 Markets for privacy-protecting products have largely failed to 
develop, and consumers may have little incentive to seek out such products 
if their personal information is typically exposed only to automated 
systems.286 Moreover, some privacy vulnerabilities are inherent in certain 
communications technologies.287 It is hardly reasonable to force people to 
abandon important modes of communication or else forfeit their right to 
privacy—that is perhaps the central lesson of Katz itself.288 
Even if judges administer it accurately, a knowledge-based Fourth 
Amendment is inherently unstable and prone to shrink over time as societal 
knowledge increases. It penalizes citizens for becoming informed about 
privacy threats and impedes political action to address such threats. The 
next Part explores some alternative approaches to Fourth Amendment 
scope. 
V. A FOURTH AMENDMENT WITHOUT SOCIETAL KNOWLEDGE 
This Part proposes that courts abandon the use of societal knowledge 
as a determinant of Fourth Amendment scope and explores some of the 
implications of doing so. Building on existing case law and scholarship,289 
it then offers two alternative models for drawing the boundaries of the 
Fourth Amendment. A comprehensive account of these models is beyond 
the scope of this Article, but this Part gives an overview of the models, 
	
284 See cases discussed supra Part II. 
285 See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. 
286 See id. 
287 For instance, any cell phone system will use towers situated at known locations, and the use of 
such towers creates the potential for government location tracking. See supra Section II.E.1. 
288 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (stating that the telephone plays a “vital 
role . . . in private communication” and its users are entitled to privacy). 
289 See sources cited supra notes 18–19. 
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explains how they would function, and discusses their relative advantages 
and disadvantages. 
A. Removing the Knowledge Inquiry 
Knowledge has played a fundamental role in determining Fourth 
Amendment scope for decades. It has become even more important in 
recent years as courts are increasingly faced with novel questions posed by 
new surveillance practices and technologies. Yet courts would do well to 
reverse this trend and to stop assessing societal knowledge altogether when 
deciding Fourth Amendment cases. Although relying on societal 
knowledge helps courts concretize the amorphous inquiry into reasonable 
expectations and decide Fourth Amendment issues in relatively broad 
strokes, the fundamental flaws of the knowledge inquiry overwhelm any 
benefits. 
Societal knowledge is a complex, multilayered concept that does not 
lend itself to easy application in criminal cases. Knowledge typically 
spreads unevenly through the population, and attributing median societal 
knowledge to criminal defendants raises questions of fundamental 
fairness.290 Judges are societal elites who are systematically likely to 
overestimate the extent of societal knowledge. Empirical evidence indicates 
that they do make serious errors in calculating such knowledge.291 Further, 
even if societal knowledge could be measured perfectly, anchoring the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope to it will lead to a gradual erosion of Fourth 
Amendment protection. As an increasingly intelligent and educated 
population gains awareness and understanding of new technologies and 
threats to privacy, expectations of privacy and the sphere of Fourth 
Amendment protection will naturally shrink. In the meantime, rapid and 
largely random changes in public awareness will render Fourth 
Amendment law unstable and unpredictable.292 These theoretical and 
practical problems should lead courts to abandon the knowledge inquiry in 
Fourth Amendment law. 
The doctrinal implications of abandoning the knowledge inquiry 
would be substantial. People’s expectations of privacy are substantially 
dependent on what they know in the present. If courts are to discard the 
problematic inquiry into societal knowledge, must they also discard Katz’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy test? 
	
290 See supra Section III.A. 
291 See supra Section III.B. 
292 See supra Part IV. 
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The answer is likely yes, at least insofar as that test directs courts to 
actually assess people’s expectations of privacy. Assessing societal 
expectations necessarily involves, either explicitly or implicitly, an 
assessment of societal knowledge.293 As long as the Katz test directs lower 
courts to determine what people reasonably expect, lower courts are likely 
to use societal knowledge to gain traction on that difficult inquiry. If the 
knowledge inquiry must go, then so must the examination of people’s 
expectations of privacy. 
The situation is more complicated than that, however, because the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test is not always applied literally. As 
Orin Kerr pointed out in a landmark study of Fourth Amendment case law, 
the Supreme Court sometimes focuses on normative or doctrinal 
considerations rather than actual expectations of maintaining privacy.294 
Kerr identifies two different normative models in the case law.295 Cases 
emphasizing the “policy model” engage in relatively overt balancing of the 
benefits or harms of allowing police to gather information without a 
warrant.296 Cases involving the “private facts model” focus on just one 
normative consideration: the intimate (or non-intimate) nature of the 
information sought by the government.297 Kerr also identifies a doctrinal 
approach called the “positive law model,” which finds a privacy violation if 
the government’s action violates a law other than the Fourth Amendment 
itself.298 
These nonexpectation models have been criticized as inconsistent with 
Katz’s binding precedent.299 They may also play less of a role than 
appearances suggest. Courts often employ multiple approaches to justify 
their decisions, and in many cases the models described above may yield 
the same outcome as a more literal application of Katz.300 The expectation 
model likely remains the dominant approach in Fourth Amendment law.301 
	
293 See supra Sections II.A–II.C. 
294 Kerr, supra note 19, at 505–06. 
295 Id. at 524.  
296 Id. at 519–20 (noting that in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001), for example, the 
Court expressly took “the long view” and made a normative choice about the appropriate level of 
privacy in the home).  
297 Id. at 512–13 (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986), for 
instance, in which the Court held that aerial photographs of a chemical plant were not a Fourth 
Amendment search because they did not reveal anything important or intimate).  
298 Id. at 516. 
299 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr 
and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1601 & n.67 (2010). 
300 See Kerr, supra note 19, at 524. 
301 See Simmons, supra note 125, at 586 n.108. 
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But the Court’s prior use of other models of Fourth Amendment scope may 
provide a basis for a new test that avoids the current regime’s increasingly 
untenable reliance on societal knowledge. By developing the nascent 
theories of privacy hinted at in the Court’s references to positive law or 
normative considerations, we can begin to fashion a Fourth Amendment 
test capable of preserving privacy in the technological age. 
The following Sections discuss how this test might be developed. 
These Sections set out some alternative approaches to determining the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope and explain how these regimes would operate. 
Again, these relatively short Sections do not offer a comprehensive 
argument in favor of these alternatives. Rather, they give an overview of 
the proposed models and examine their various strengths and weaknesses, 
highlighting the key tradeoffs among the various Fourth Amendment 
regimes. 
B. The Fourth Amendment as a Reflection of Positive Law 
In Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has often used non-
Fourth Amendment sources of law to help it analyze reasonable 
expectations of privacy. The underlying principle of these cases is that the 
law itself is a reflection of people’s reasonable expectations. That is, if the 
government broke some law in order to obtain information, then it has 
probably violated people’s expectations of privacy. But this principle is not 
universal.302 Nor is it necessary to break the law in order to violate the 
Fourth Amendment.303 
The Court could take a different path. It could instead develop a test 
that looks exclusively to positive law in determining the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment. Under this regime, the absence of a law or common law tort 
prohibiting some government information-gathering activity would 
definitively establish that the activity was not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. The reverse would also apply—when a government 
investigative action violated positive law, it would constitute a per se 
Fourth Amendment search.304 
	
302 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183–84 (1984) (holding that police officers who 
violated trespass law did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
303 The Court has often held that surveillance activity that breaks no other law nonetheless violates 
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Bond v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987). 
304 This would require revising some existing doctrines. For instance, under current law, police 
encroachments on privately owned open fields are not considered searches under the Fourth 
Amendment despite clearly violating trespass law. See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183–84.   
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The core concept of a positive law approach would be that police 
officers do not “search” under the Fourth Amendment if they have acted 
lawfully and committed no tort or property violation. This concept finds 
some support in the Supreme Court’s recent trespass-focused cases305 and 
recent scholarship advocating that government investigations be regulated 
by state laws,306 or that government officials be bound by positive law and 
prohibited from lawfully using government authority to gather information 
unless they have a warrant.307 These variations each have their own unique 
advantages and disadvantages, but in the interests of clarity and brevity this 
Section will evaluate only its own proposal: a Fourth Amendment regime 
where only government actions that violate some law or legal duty 
constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 
Such a regime would have some major advantages over the current 
expectation-based test. The risk that the Fourth Amendment might shrink 
as knowledge grows would be largely eliminated. Although existing laws 
would occasionally change, overall stability would likely increase, 
especially since many of the relevant property and tort concepts have been 
around for centuries. A positive law regime would also likely increase 
predictability for both citizens and police. Rather than having to guess at 
how courts will assess expectations or calculate societal knowledge, these 
actors could look to legal codes or the law of trespass to determine the 
extent of Fourth Amendment protections. 
However, such a regime would present a number of challenges. For 
one, the positive law inquiry might be difficult in novel surveillance 
contexts presenting unresolved legal issues. Such issues may arise 
	
305 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–17 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
949–50 (2012).  
306 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Contingent Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY L.J. 1229, 
1284–87 (2015); Laurent Sacharoff, Constitutional Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877 (2014).  
Mannheimer argues that citizens’ rights against unreasonable searches and seizures are largely 
contingent on state laws regulating police behavior and that such an approach is most consistent with 
the views of the primary proponents of the Bill of Rights. Mannheimer, supra, at 1285–86. Sacharoff 
proposes a trespass-based Fourth Amendment test that tracks state laws and is inspired by the Jones and 
Jardines cases. Sacharoff, supra. 
307 William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 
129 HARV. L. REV 1821 (2016). Baude and Stern argue, on historical and other grounds, that the Fourth 
Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement should attach whenever a government actor violates 
positive law or uses government authority to obtain information. Id. at 1831–32. This 
“nonexceptionalis[t]” positive law model leans less heavily on legislatures, likely providing more 
privacy protection overall but enjoying fewer of the advantages of legislative control, such as clarity, 
predictability, and greater institutional competence. See id. at 1850–54. It also likely offers more 
protection for information held by third parties, although it does so at the cost of making Fourth 
Amendment protection more arbitrary—third-party privacy would largely depend on the efficacy of the 
government’s use of informal pressures to persuade ISPs and telephone companies to share data. See id. 
at 1873–74.  
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frequently in Fourth Amendment cases, because defendants would likely 
assert trespass, privacy tort, and statutory claims against police officers in 
situations that would rarely, if ever, generate litigation between private 
citizens.308 Thus a positive law regime, although likely more predictable 
than the Katz test, may still be unpredictable in many cases—especially 
those involving new technologies or investigative actions rarely taken by 
civilians. 
A positive law rule may also raise concerns about legislation designed 
to undermine core Fourth Amendment protections for privacy in citizens’ 
homes or belongings.309 Such concerns might be addressed at least in part 
by allowing courts to strike down laws that undermine traditional, property-
based Fourth Amendment safeguards. For example, if Congress were to 
pass legislation making it lawful for anyone to encroach on the curtilage of 
a home, courts might strike it down (as applied to the police) on the basis 
that it would undermine longstanding, property-based Fourth Amendment 
protections. This exception to the positive law rule could allow courts to 
protect a substantial core of Fourth Amendment protection from 
governmental intrusion without undermining the general structure of a 
positive law regime. Of course, even a narrow exception would somewhat 
diminish the predictability of the positive law approach. 
The transition to a positive law regime may also be difficult, because 
such an approach would be substantially underprotective at first. There are 
likely several areas where privacy-protecting legislation was considered 
unnecessary because courts had already regulated police behavior under the 
Fourth Amendment. However, if courts adopted a positive law rule, leaving 
privacy protection in the hands of Congress and state legislatures, those 
bodies would presumably respond with some additional privacy-protecting 
laws.310 
Accordingly, a positive law regime would carry with it the benefits 
and costs of enhanced legislative control over criminal procedure. Several 
scholars have argued in favor of a greater role for legislatures in regulating 
	
308 In both of the recent cases that the Supreme Court resolved on the basis that the police 
committed a trespass, the trespass question was novel and difficult to resolve. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1422–24 (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that a police officer did not commit trespass by walking to a 
home’s front door accompanied by a drug-sniffing dog and noting the absence of precedent on the 
issue); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957–58 & n.2 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that 
attaching a GPS tracker to a car is not a trespass to chattels under current law and may not have been 
under the common law of 1791).  
309 See Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 330–31 (2016). 
310 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 
792–802 (2006) (describing the political forces that would likely motivate criminal procedure 
legislation in the absence of court-driven regulation). 
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police behavior.311 Legislators may have informational advantages over 
courts, as legislators are able to solicit input from a variety of sources and 
to revise and amend draft bills before they become law.312 Legislatures are 
capable of comprehensive, forward-looking regulation of an entire area, 
rather than the case-by-case lawmaking that is typical of courts.313 
Legislatures are also better suited to enacting structural reforms that can 
identify and prevent police misconduct rather than relying on the uncertain 
ex post deterrence of the exclusionary rule.314 
On the other hand, a Fourth Amendment test that relies on legislative 
action to address novel surveillance issues may systematically underprotect 
privacy. Because of the substantial enactment costs of legislation and the 
preferences of entrenched interest groups, there is a powerful bias in favor 
of the legislative status quo315—which in the privacy context would be the 
lack of statutory regulation of surveillance. Legislative status quo bias may 
also be increasing over time. At the federal level, for instance, passing 
legislation has become more difficult as Congress grows more polarized 
and the use of filibusters becomes routine.316 This latter effect may be 
mitigated somewhat by the fact that political support for privacy protection 
can be found among both liberals and libertarian-leaning conservatives, 
increasing the relative likelihood of bipartisan legislation. State legislatures 
may also be able to fill many of the gaps created by federal gridlock, 
especially in states with governments dominated by a single party.317 
Legislative sclerosis is a particular concern in the Fourth Amendment 
context because of the difficulty of addressing technological change under 
a positive law regime. New technologies can enable the police to invade 
personal privacy without violating property or other laws.318 Moreover, 
statutes governing communications and other technologies tend to become 
obsolete fairly quickly, and Congress has historically failed to amend such 
	
311 Id.; Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the 
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004); John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law 
Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205 (2015). 
312 E.g., Kerr, supra note 311, at 881. 
313 E.g., id. at 868–70. 
314 Rappaport, supra note 311, at 239–40. 
315 See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO 
LOSES, AND WHY 24–26, 45 (2009).  
316 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
14 (2014). 
317 See Rappaport, supra note 311, at 236, 253. 
318 Kerr, supra note 19, at 533–34.  
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laws quickly enough to keep up with technological change.319 The 
likelihood of legislatures effectively regulating privacy is diminished when 
they must enact major amendments to each relevant law every few years to 
keep pace with new technologies. 
There are other substantial downsides to a positive law regime of 
Fourth Amendment scope. The protection that non-Fourth Amendment 
laws offer may often be arbitrary, because such laws are enacted for a wide 
range of reasons that may have nothing to do with privacy.320 Basing the 
Fourth Amendment on property concepts or trespass law can also lead to 
absurd results. For example, in the pre-Katz era, the Court held in separate 
cases that police violated the Fourth Amendment when they used a 
microphone that touched a heating duct in a suspect’s house,321 but did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment when they used a microphone that did not 
physically encroach on a suspect’s property.322 It is the eavesdropping on 
private conversations, rather than the touching of a heating duct, that 
invades a person’s privacy and raises concerns about government 
oppression—but under a positive law regime, only the physical touching 
matters. This is not an inevitable feature of a positive law approach, 
however, as legislatures may eventually fill in at least some of the gaps left 
by a property-based regime. 
C. Direct Normative Balancing 
In deciding the complex cases that make up most of its docket, the 
Supreme Court frequently makes normative judgments based on policy 
considerations.323 Fourth Amendment cases are no different.324 But the 
precise character of the normative inquiry used in some Fourth Amendment 
cases is difficult to discern. The Court’s general approach is simply to 
identify and balance policy considerations that support expanding or 
	
319 See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for 
Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 768–71 (2005). 
320 Kerr, supra note 19, at 533.  
321 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961). 
322 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 466 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41 (1967)). 
323 See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658, 
2671–77 (2015) (upholding Arizona’s independent congressional redistricting commission based on 
policy and precedential considerations); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2633–34, 2637–38 (2014) 
(discussing the practical downsides of a longstanding labor law precedent and the policy reasons for 
refusing to extend it to medical home-care workers). 
324 See Kerr, supra note 19 at 519–21.  
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curtailing the Fourth Amendment’s scope.325 Likewise, most of the 
scholarship on normative approaches to the Fourth Amendment has 
focused on identifying especially invasive surveillance techniques or noting 
some of the general circumstances that are relevant to privacy, such as the 
location and nature of the information sought.326  
Merely considering the policy implications of Fourth Amendment 
decisions is not a sufficiently rigorous test for determining Fourth 
Amendment scope.327 A more promising approach focuses on explicit 
normative balancing—weighing the benefits to law enforcement of an 
information-gathering activity against the harms to citizens. The Supreme 
Court has provided a doctrinal foundation for such an approach in a case 
involving prison cell inspections. In Hudson v. Palmer, the Court resolved 
the question whether police could examine a prisoner’s cell without 
probable cause by directly balancing “the interest of society in the security 
of its penal institutions” against “the interest of the prisoner in privacy 
within his cell.”328 Because a prisoner’s interest in privacy is already greatly 
compromised, society’s interest in safe prisons outweighs it, and 
suspicionless inspections of prison cells do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.329 
The balance of benefits to law enforcement and harms to privacy 
arguably goes to the core of the Fourth Amendment inquiry considered in 
this Article. Unfortunately for our purposes, however, it is not a rigorous or 
well-elaborated test. It requires each individual court to determine how best 
to assess privacy harms—a practice that would likely lead to inconsistent 
conclusions about which aspects of privacy are most valuable. Scholars 
have established numerous theories of privacy and created large 
	
325 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) (reasoning that privacy in houses 
should be maintained at roughly the same level that it was prior to the invention of thermal imagers); 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979) (reasoning that the Fourth Amendment’s scope 
would be too small if the government were allowed to search automobiles without suspicion).  
326 See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 3, ¶¶ 60–70 (listing characteristics of invasive techniques); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the 
(Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us 
Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 985–1014 (2007) (noting several nondispositive factors relevant to privacy); 
Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age 
of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 722–23 (1988) (listing factors 
relevant to privacy). 
327 See Ohm, supra note 130, at 1312 (criticizing existing normative approaches on similar 
grounds). 
328 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984). 
329 Id. at 527–28 (first citing Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143–44 (1962); and then citing 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)).  
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taxonomies of privacy harms.330 There are also harms to citizens that cannot 
be classified as privacy harms but are nonetheless relevant to the Fourth 
Amendment balance, such as psychological trauma resulting from police 
coercion or the threat of force.331 Asking courts to consider each potential 
harm would result in indeterminacy and prohibitively high decision costs. 
Courts could, however, develop a more concrete direct balancing test. 
I propose one such test below, the aim of which is to incorporate essential 
categories of law enforcement benefits and citizen harms, while remaining 
concise and workable for judges. This is certainly not the only feasible 
balancing test imaginable, and I invite others to propose modifications and 
alternatives, keeping the goals of comprehensiveness and workability in 
mind. What follows is a brief overview of the proposed test and an analysis 
of its primary strengths and weaknesses. 
1. An Elaborated Balancing Test.—A direct normative balancing test 
would find a Fourth Amendment search when the harms to citizens of 
allowing police to engage in a certain type of surveillance without a 
warrant outweigh the benefits to society via improved law enforcement. 
The facts of the case would define the type of surveillance at issue, but the 
assessment would consider the benefits and costs of allowing the police to 
conduct such warrantless surveillance in general.332 This inquiry would 
align courts’ assessments with the potential consequences of their Fourth 
Amendment decisions. After all, when a court decides that the police may 
dig through one individual’s trash bags without a warrant, the police can 
then lawfully dig through the trash bags of any citizen in the court’s 
jurisdiction.333 
	
330 See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION (1983); 
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006). 
331 William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1016, 1065–66 (1995). 
332 For a less fact-based approach to determining when to apply the Fourth Amendment, see David 
Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 101–03 (2013) 
(advocating for Fourth Amendment rulings that would apply to all uses of a given technology). 
333 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). Of course, resource constraints are likely 
to prevent police departments from examining the trash of every citizen in a jurisdiction. For different 
types of surveillance or for national security matters, however, the government might actually surveil 
most or all citizens. Courts applying a normative test would primarily focus on the domestic law 
enforcement context but could also consider the domestic security context if doing so is helpful. By 
contrast, foreign intelligence surveillance may be exempt from the warrant requirement in any event, 
making the question whether such surveillance is a “search” largely irrelevant. See generally United 
States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913–15 (4th Cir. 1980) (discussing the various reasons that 
“the courts should not require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign 
intelligence surveillance,” but noting that those reasons do not justify warrantless domestic 
surveillance).  
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I briefly describe the factors of my proposed test below, starting with 
the benefits to the law enforcement side of the balance. These benefits can 
be elaborated as two factors: the usefulness of surveillance conducted 
without a warrant in detecting crime, and the cost of substituting less 
invasive forms of surveillance. The first factor essentially asks, how 
valuable to law enforcement would it be to be able to engage in this type of 
surveillance without a warrant? Thus, a court might consider whether a 
surveillance technique would primarily be used in the early stages of 
investigations, before probable cause has been developed, and whether the 
warrantless use of the technique would be likely to reveal criminal activity 
that would otherwise go undetected.334 For example, if obtaining certain 
financial records without a warrant would allow police to identify white-
collar crimes that would otherwise be difficult to detect, that would weigh 
in favor of excluding such records from Fourth Amendment regulation.335 
The second factor asks: is there a less invasive practice that could 
reveal roughly the same information, and if so how costly would it be for 
police to use that practice instead? If a surveillance technique is invasive or 
affects an entire population, and an alternative approach could obtain the 
same information in a less invasive or more targeted way, that would weigh 
in favor of applying the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to 
such surveillance. Courts currently ask a similar question in cases involving 
the Wiretap Act, which directs the government to show that it has 
attempted other, less invasive investigative procedures before applying for 
a wiretap.336 
On the other side of the balance, the harms to citizens can be 
elaborated as three factors: the societal costs of people avoiding certain 
activities because of fear of surveillance; the harm to interpersonal 
relationships caused by observation; and psychological harm suffered due 
	
334 Courts could also consider relevant studies examining the effects of limiting various 
surveillance techniques. One recent study, for instance, found that subjecting telephone call logs to a 
warrant requirement resulted in fewer applications for wiretaps and a decrease in the duration of 
permitted wiretaps. Anne E. Boustead, Does Rejection of the Third Party Doctrine Change Use of 
Electronic Surveillance? Evidence from the Wiretap Reports (manuscript at 21–24), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD300/RGSD384/RAND_RGSD384.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZKQ-98JA] (on file with author). Its findings suggest that regulating the 
acquisition of call log data reduces police officers’ ability to obtain sufficient probable cause for 
Wiretap Act applications. Id. 
335 See Kerr, supra note 47, at 509 (explaining that the Supreme Court eliminated the warrant 
requirement for financial records following the rise of difficult-to-detect white-collar crimes); see also 
David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. 
Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 777–78, 798 (2013) (discussing types of digital evidence 
that are especially helpful in detecting healthcare fraud and cyberharassment).  
336 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012); United States v. Carter, 449 F.3d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 
2006).  
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to surveillance or investigation. The first factor asks, if a surveillance 
technique hypothetically became widespread and well-known, would 
people avoid socially beneficial activities and, if so, how costly would that 
be? People engage in all manner of potentially embarrassing or 
controversial activities, such as visiting a psychiatrist, purchasing certain 
drugs or medical equipment, researching sensitive subjects online, or 
criticizing government or social elites. These socially beneficial activities 
can be deterred by the threat of surveillance.337 For example, Google 
searches for terms deemed by user surveys as especially controversial or 
embarrassing decreased significantly following Edward Snowden’s 
disclosure of an NSA program capable of capturing internet information.338 
If a surveillance practice is likely to cause such chilling effects, that would 
weigh in favor of Fourth Amendment protection.339 
The second factor asks whether a surveillance practice would harm 
interpersonal relationships by compromising intimate communications, 
preventing the formation of relationships, or reducing the quality or depth 
of intimate relationships via the threat of observation. Intimate 
relationships are extremely important to people’s well-being and 
particularly dependent on privacy to flourish.340 The impact of outside 
surveillance on relationships is also likely to be relatively easy for judges to 
intuit, once they endeavor to assess it. If, for instance, a surveillance 
technique is likely to interfere with personal communications enough to 
prevent people from expressing private, provocative, or intimate thoughts 
to each other,341 that would weigh in favor of finding a Fourth Amendment 
search. 
	
337 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1129–32 (2002) 
(discussing the importance of privacy to many personal and group practices). 
338 Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior 
(April 29, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412564&download=yes [https://perma.cc/CFV9-GMNK]. Search terms 
studied included “abortion,” “gender reassignment,” “police brutality,” and “tax avoidance.” Id. at 35–
37. 
339 The costs of defending oneself against surveillance in order to engage in beneficial activities 
would also be relevant to the analysis of this factor. See generally Simmons, supra note 125, at 558 
(discussing the defensive costs of privacy protection). For example, if internet users are likely to 
purchase and use sophisticated encryption software in order to mitigate government surveillance, the 
costs of doing so would be added to the avoidance cost calculus. Defensive expenditures are likely to be 
relatively small, however, because effective defenses against government surveillance are likely to be 
unavailable or prohibitively costly. See supra notes 187–89. 
340 See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 19, at 923–24. 
341 See Carl Botan, Communication Work and Electronic Surveillance: A Model for Predicting 
Panoptic Effects, 63 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 293, 307, 309–10 (1996) (finding that workers under 
surveillance engaged in fewer personal communications). 
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Finally, the third factor asks whether, even in the absence of tangible 
effects on activities or relationships, people will suffer psychological harm 
as a result of surveillance or investigation. This inquiry would preferably 
focus on the concrete harms demonstrated in psychological studies,342 but it 
could also incorporate more theoretical claims about privacy and 
personality development.343 That said, most judges would likely not 
research surveillance and psychological harm themselves, but would rely 
on the submissions of parties in litigated cases—much as judges and juries 
examine the parties’ arguments in personal injury cases and assess damages 
for psychological pain and suffering.344 Under this factor, evidence that a 
surveillance technique will likely cause stress, decreased motivation, or 
feelings of infantilization in the people observed345 would weigh in favor of 
Fourth Amendment protection. 
If, considering these factors, the total harm to citizens from 
warrantless surveillance outweighs the total benefit from enhanced law 
enforcement, courts should hold that the Fourth Amendment requires 
police to obtain a warrant before conducting the surveillance. Conversely, 
if the benefit to law enforcement outweighs the privacy harm, then the 
police should be able to conduct the surveillance without Fourth 
Amendment regulation. 
2. Evaluating the Direct Normative Approach.—The factors 
identified above are intended to be both concrete and pragmatic. They 
direct courts’ attention to the core policy considerations of the Fourth 
Amendment inquiry but do not require courts to establish any particular 
definition of privacy. Of course, courts can and should consider other 
sources of information in answering the questions raised by the direct 
	
342 See, e.g., id. at 307–10; John R. Aiello & Kathryn J. Kolb, Electronic Performance Monitoring 
and Social Context: Impact on Productivity and Stress, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 339, 339–40 (1995); see 
also Stuntz, supra note 331, at 1065–66 (discussing psychological harm arising from police coercion). 
343 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423–28 (2000). 
344 See Sean Hannon Williams, Self-Altering Injury: The Hidden Harms of Hedonic Adaptation, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 543–44 & n.42 (2011) (collecting cases involving hedonic damages). In fact, 
the inquiry would be substantially easier, as the psychological harm from surveillance need only be 
situated somewhere on the general scale from low to high and would not have to be translated into a 
precise money value. Fact finders tend to be far more consistent in performing the former calculation 
than the latter. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and 
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2097–2103 & tbl.1 (1998) (finding that mock jurors assessing 
various hypothetical cases tend to give consistent rankings of blameworthiness but very different 
damages awards). 
345 See Botan, supra note 341, at 309; Carl Botan & Mihaela Vorvoreanu, “What Are You Really 
Saying to Me?” Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, CERIAS TECH REPORT, June 2000, at 9–10, 
http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Botan_2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW9G-MPBN] (paper originally 
presented at the Conference of the International Communication Association in Acapulco, Mexico). 
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balancing test. For example, survey information about how invasive people 
consider various surveillance techniques may be helpful, as might the 
identification of well-defined social norms relevant to privacy.346 But 
ultimately this normative approach is distinguished by its directness. It calls 
for courts to address the central normative balance underlying Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, rather than a proxy consideration (like 
expectations of privacy) that does not fully capture that balance.347 
This Section discusses some strengths and weaknesses of a direct 
normative approach to determining Fourth Amendment scope. Such a 
regime would have substantial advantages over other existing or potential 
tests. As mentioned above, a court’s Fourth Amendment holding in a given 
case will determine the legality of similar instances of surveillance and 
affect the behavior of all government entities and potentially all citizens in 
the court’s jurisdiction.348 A normative approach would allow courts to 
consider these implications directly, potentially producing better decisions 
than a regime based on proxy doctrines like the Katz test or a positive law 
standard. Relatedly, the approach would focus on the normative core of the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry and directly analyze societal costs and benefits. 
If judges administer it effectively, then its outcomes should maximize 
societal welfare. In practice, however, judges may be unable to apply the 
test effectively, as I discuss further below. 
One benefit of a direct approach is that it would better harmonize 
theory and practice. To the extent that the Supreme Court is already 
deciding cases based on normative considerations while purporting to rely 
on assessments of societal knowledge,349 a normative approach would align 
the Court’s opinions with the considerations actually driving its decisions. 
Supreme Court cases directing courts to look to societal knowledge or other 
problematic metrics can cause significant harm even if the Court’s 
decisions are primarily driven by policy considerations.350 Not only are 
	
346 See, e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.1(d), at 587–90 (5th ed. 2012); Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 219, at 737. 
347 See Kerr, supra note 19, at 536 (noting that the policy model of Fourth Amendment law 
addresses “the basic goal of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, which must identify police 
practices that are reasonable per se and separate them out from more invasive police practices that could 
only be reasonable in some specific contexts”).  
348 Exceptions to this general rule can be imagined, but typically, a court’s ruling on the 
constitutionality of a type of surveillance will be determinative in cases involving the same surveillance 
technique.  
349 See Kerr, supra note 19, at 519, 522 (suggesting that normative considerations likely drive 
outcomes in Supreme Court Fourth Amendment cases even when the opinion focuses on expectations 
of privacy or positive law). 
350 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 269–72 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court is an inherently political court).  
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lower courts likely to follow the doctrines set out by the Supreme Court,351 
but the Court itself may feel compelled to follow the same doctrines in 
subsequent cases regardless of whether those doctrines produce undesirable 
outcomes.352 
A direct normative approach would also be resilient to societal change 
and in little danger of shrinking as knowledge of privacy threats increases. 
It would be better suited than a positive law regime to addressing new 
surveillance technologies, as it would not require new legislation to address 
novel privacy issues.353 This adaptability may be especially important given 
the outsized role that technological change plays in Fourth Amendment 
law.354 
Finally, the normative approach would allow courts to consider the 
psychological effects of police practices that infringe upon Fourth 
Amendment values other than privacy. In many law enforcement contexts, 
such as stop-and-frisk encounters or vehicle stops, police coercion and the 
threat of force cause citizens more psychological harm than the 
concomitant privacy violations.355 These harms may be exacerbated if the 
surveillance at issue has been carried out in a discriminatory or non-
investigatory manner.356 The Katz test’s focus on expectations of privacy 
leaves little room for weighing these substantial harms. 
One of the disadvantages of a direct normative test would be its 
complexity relative to other potential tests. Multifactor tests generally 
impose higher decision costs per case than simpler tests.357 A Fourth 
Amendment normative test also asks judges to consider the future effects of 
their decisions on police and citizen behavior, a policy inquiry that is 
arguably better suited to a legislature.358 Of course, judges are hardly 
inexperienced in considering the policy implications of their decisions. 
	
351 Kerr, supra note 19, at 545–46; Tokson, supra note 173, at 908.  
352 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (voting to reverse but noting, “[w]ere we writing on a clean slate, I would [vote to] 
affirm”); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279–82 (1972) (upholding an arguably “unrealistic, 
inconsistent, or illogical” ruling regarding baseball’s antitrust status because “the aberration is an 
established one”) (citing Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (noting that the 
rule is undesirable but well established)).  
353 See supra notes 315–19 and accompanying text. 
354 See Kerr, supra note 47, at 528.  
355 Stuntz, supra note 331, at 1065–66. 
356 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
357 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 572–86 
(1992). 
358 Legislatures tend to take a broader view of policy issues and to consider future consequences. 
Courts more typically decide cases on the basis of past events or by addressing particular 
circumstances. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 311, at 868.  
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When faced with a question of first impression, especially one not easily 
resolved by reference to existing laws or precedents, courts often expressly 
consider the policy implications of their potential rulings.359 Moreover, 
even in cases purportedly decided based on formal doctrinal interpretations, 
judges’ decisions are often driven by underlying policy considerations.360 
Accordingly, litigants have been presenting “Brandeis briefs” focusing on 
policy arguments and empirical data since well before Louis Brandeis filed 
his famous brief in Muller v. Oregon in 1908.361 The use of general, policy-
relevant facts by courts has continued and possibly accelerated in the 
internet age, and can be observed in state as well as federal courts.362 None 
of this is to say that courts are as well suited to forward-looking policy 
judgment as legislatures are. They are, however, capable of such judgment 
and exercise it more than occasionally. 
Another concern is that a normative regime would also give judges a 
great deal of discretion in setting the boundaries of Fourth Amendment 
protection. Judicial assessments of costs and benefits might vary widely, 
especially among judges with different policy preferences or attitudes about 
privacy. However, the discretion granted by the normative test may not 
ultimately differ much from that granted by the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test. Judges’ assessments of knowledge and expectation may be 
strongly influenced by their preferences and biases,363 and the largely 
nonempirical nature of the knowledge inquiry gives judges a great deal of 
discretion in dictating case outcomes. 
A related objection to policy-focused Fourth Amendment regimes in 
general is that they would be unpredictable and inconsistent across cases.364 
This lack of predictability is also problematic because the Fourth 
Amendment regulates police behavior, and the police may have difficulty 
predicting what is lawful under a normative regime.365 These drawbacks are 
	
359 This occurs frequently in the Fourth Amendment context, see, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332, 344–46 (2009); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–28 (1984), and in other contexts, see, e.g., 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 452–54 (1984); United States ex 
rel. Martin v. Life Care Centers. of America, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549, 571–72 (E.D. Tenn. 2014); In 
re Rose, 512 B.R. 790, 796 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014); Rothrock v. Rothrock Motor Sales, Inc., 810 A.2d 
114, 117 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
360 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 19, at 519, 522; POSNER, supra note 350, at 111, 118–19. 
361 See Noga Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, and the Brandeis Brief: The Origins of a Myth, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 59, 71–72 (discussing how judicial reliance on “legislative facts” about public 
health predates Brandeis’s famous brief).  
362 See Cathy Cochran, Surfing the Web for a “Brandeis Brief”: The Internet and Judicial Use of 
Legislative Facts, 70 TEX. B.J. 780, 780–82 (2007). 
363 See supra Section III.B.2. 
364 E.g., Kerr, supra note 19, at 536. 
365 See Amsterdam, supra note 42, at 403–04. 
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significant, but a normative regime would probably not be any more 
unpredictable than the current system of Fourth Amendment law, where 
courts focus on one of several models of the Katz test more or less at 
random.366 Even the positive law regime may be unpredictable when faced 
with new legal issues.367 
In most situations, under any test, police will simply look to settled 
law on the constitutionality of various investigation activities. An officer 
need not conduct a fresh Fourth Amendment inquiry to know that he needs 
a warrant to search a house, tap a phone, open a sealed letter, look through 
a footlocker, or examine a cell phone’s contents. Novel situations, by 
contrast, may be difficult for police officers to resolve no matter how the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope is determined. 
A normative standard may also become more rule-like and predictable 
over time. As courts flesh out the normative test and determine the 
constitutionality of various types of activity, future applications of the test 
will become more predictable.368 That said, the outcomes of a multifactor 
test would be less certain than a rule-based regime. Thus the positive law 
approach, whatever its other drawbacks, would likely perform best in terms 
of predictability and consistency across decisions. 
Both of these alternatives would be more resilient to social and 
technological change and the expansion of societal knowledge than the 
current regime. They would be no less predictable than the multimodel 
Katz approach. And both would avoid the conceptual and practical 
problems at the core of a knowledge-based test. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts rely heavily on societal knowledge to determine the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope. In part, this reliance is compelled by the Katz test—
what people know generally dictates their reasonable expectations of 
privacy. But courts’ reliance is also driven by the relative ease of making 
intuitive judgments about societal knowledge. Rather than considering the 
questions at the core of the Fourth Amendment—questions about the harms 
of oppressive surveillance and the benefits of unfettered police 
investigations—courts can simply decide whether people knew their 
privacy was compromised. 
Yet, as this Article has shown, there are substantial conceptual 
problems inherent in the assessment of societal knowledge. Knowledge is 
	
366 See Kerr, supra note 19, at 507–25. 
367 See supra note 308 and accompanying text.  
368 See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 654–55 (2014). 
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not a simple binary; it is a complex, multiphase process. It spreads 
unevenly throughout the population and may never reach people with lower 
levels of social status, education, or wealth. Moreover, people may remain 
ignorant of widely available knowledge because they fail to process 
information that challenges their beliefs or rationally avoid learning 
information for which they have little use. Marshaling existing studies of 
user knowledge and original survey data, this Article has demonstrated how 
these problems result in empirical errors in Fourth Amendment cases. 
This Article has also examined whether, even if societal knowledge 
could be measured perfectly, courts should nonetheless abandon its use as a 
determinant of the Fourth Amendment’s scope. Demographic data strongly 
suggests that future generations will be more intelligent, better educated, 
and far more knowledgeable about technology than the current population. 
A knowledge-based Fourth Amendment is likely to shrink over time as 
society becomes better informed about new technologies and threats to 
privacy. In the interim, societal knowledge will be unpredictable and 
unstable, prone to sudden spikes in awareness following high-salience 
news stories or government leaks. This Article has outlined some 
alternative approaches likely to be more coherent and more durable than 
the current model. Going forward, Fourth Amendment law might embrace 
privacy protection dictated by traditional property concepts and by 
Congress, or it might look more directly at the normative balance 
underlying the concept of a Fourth Amendment search. These approaches 
have their own disadvantages, but either would avoid the central danger of 
the current approach—a Fourth Amendment of ever-declining relevance to 
government surveillance and citizens’ privacy. 
 
